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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A EVALUATIO OF THE IRAIA UCLEAR PROGRAM FROM A  
 
POWER TRASITIO PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
EZGĐ UZUN 
 
Program of Political Science, M.A. Thesis, 2011 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Key Words: Iran Nuclear Program, Power Transition Theory, the Middle East 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
 
  
The Iranian nuclear issue erupted in 2002, when anti-governmental Iranians in exile 
disclosed two formerly unknown nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak. Iran was a 
member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While there were other proliferation 
cases by states not party to the NPT, Iranian issue became the center of international 
concern. Despite incentives and sanctions by the international community, Iran did not 
suspend its nuclear program. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to explain why 
the international community is especially concerned about the Iranian nuclear program 
and why Iran is so insistent on its nuclear program. This study has adopted the power 
transition theory perspective to analyze the Iranian nuclear issue with reference to the 
change in Middle Eastern power balances in the post-9/11 period.   
 
The fall of Iraq in 2003 has created a power vacuum in the Middle East. Given its high 
GDP levels, big population, and oil-rich territory, Iran regards itself as the potential 
power to fill this power vacuum. The USA has established a status-quo in the region, 
which serves its regional interests. The rise of Iran might mean a challenge to US 
interests in the region. An analysis of domestic systems differences, dissatisfaction with 
the international norms, membership to international and regional organizations not 
dominated by the USA and missile build-up has shown that Iran is dissatisfied with the 
US led status-quo. The nuclear program serves as a tool for Iran to challenge the US-led 
status-quo and become a leading regional power. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
ĐRA'I ÜKLEER PROGRAMII GÜÇ GEÇĐŞĐ KURAMIA GÖRE  
 
BĐR ĐCELEMESĐ 
 
EZGĐ UZUN 
 
 
Siyaset Bilimi Programı, Sanatta Yeterlilik Tezi, 2011 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Iran'ın Nükleer Programı, Güç Geçişi Kuramı, Orta Doğu, 
Nükleer Silahsızlanma 
 
Đran nükleer krizi, 2002 yılında Đran dışında yaşayan hükümet karşıtı bir grup 
Đranlının Natanz ve Arak şehirlerinde daha önce bilinmeyen iki nükleer tesisi 
ifşasıyla ortaya çıkmıştır. Đran, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme Anlaşması'na 
taraf bir ülkedir. Bu anlaşmaya taraf olmayan ve nükleer silah elde etmiş başka 
ülkeler olmasına karşın, uluslar arası camia özellikle Đran'ın nükleer programına 
odaklanmıştır. Đran kendisine sunulan teşvik paketleri ve getirilen yaptırımlara 
rağmen, nükleer programından vazgeçmemiştir. Bu araştırma, uluslar arası camianın 
neden özellikle Đran'ın nükleer programına odaklandığını ve Đran'ın neden nükleer 
program konusunda bu kadar ısrarcı olduğunu açıklamayı amaçlamıştır. Bu 
çalışmada Đran nükleer krizi, güç geçişi kuramından yola çıkılarak Orta Doğu'da 11 
Eylül sonrası gözlemlenen güç değişimleri çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. 
 
2003 yılında Irak'ın devrilmesi, Orta Doğu'da bir güç boşluğu yaratmıştır. Đran'ın 
yüksek gayrisafi yurtiçi hasılası, büyük nüfusu ve zengin petrol rezervleri, Đran'ın bu 
güç boşluğunu kendisinin doldurabileceğine dair isteğini artırmıştır. ABD bölgede 
kendi çıkarlarına hizmet eden bölgesel bir statüko kurmuştur. Đran'ın muhtemel 
yükselişi, ABD'nin bölgedeki çıkarlarına hizmet eden bu statükoya karşı bir tehdit 
oluşturmaktadır. Đki ülkenin iç politik ve ekonomik sistemindeki farklılıklar, Đran'ın 
uluslar arası normlardan duyduğu hoşnutsuzluk, ABD'nin etkisinde olmayan uluslar 
arası ve bölgesel örgütlere üyelik ve Đran'ın gelişmiş füze programı, Đran'ın ABD 
vi 
 
tarafından kurulan statükodan memnun olmadığını göstermektedir. Nükleer program, 
Đran'ın ABD tarafından yönetilen bu statükoyu değiştirmesine ve bölgesel güç 
olabilmesine hizmet edebilecek bir araç olarak görülmektedir.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
ITRODUCTIO 
 
 
 
  
1.1 The Scope and Purpose of the Study 
 
 
 
In 2002, a group of anti-governmental Iranians in exile claimed that Iran was 
constructing a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water facility in the Persian 
cities of Natanz and Arak. Iran had been party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), thereby being committed to nuclear energy development for peaceful purposes 
only. By its membership to the NPT regime, Iran had also recognized the International 
Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) authority to inspect the Iranian nuclear activities 
which were declared to the IAEA. However, Iran had not notified the IAEA of the 
construction of those two sites. Therefore, the Iranian dissidents' declaration was both 
confusing and alarming for the international community. The allegation of the Iranian 
dissidents was soon proved by a US investigation on the satellite photos of Natanz and 
Arak. This was the beginning of a nuclear crisis which would have serious implications 
not only for international security but also for the survival of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime.  
 
 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime was an initiative by the USA to prevent 
the spread of nuclear material and nuclear technology to countries who do not yet 
possess that technology. The regime was established by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 1968. The Treaty sought to limit the possession of nuclear weapons only to 
five nuclear power holders at the time, which were the USA, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom, China and France. Other states that did not possess nuclear weapons 
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were forbidden to do so and the nuclear power holders were called for a gradual 
elimination of their capabilities with the Treaty. The Treaty had created an international 
nuclear order, which legitimized the existence of five nuclear powers, while 
delegitimizing the aspiration of any other state to have nuclear weapons technology. 
Except three nations, all others had been integrated to this global nuclear order. With 
such a high membership level, NPT regime initially seemed highly successful.    
   
 However, the NPT regime has not gone unchallenged over time. First of all, 
three countries which had not integrated themselves to the regime - India, Pakistan and 
Israel- acquired nuclear weapons. As a result, the number of nuclear weapons states 
rose from five to eight. A second challenge to the nuclear order came from North Korea. 
Although party to the NPT, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003 and declared 
itself as a nuclear state in 2009. Moreover, the nature of nuclear threats underwent a 
transformation in the post-9/11 security environment. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
the nuclear threats have come to include non-state actors as well. The transfer of the 
poorly protected nuclear materials from the ex-Soviet Union states through theft or sale 
has become a pressing security issue.1 Moreover, the disclosure of nuclear black market 
channels run by the A.Q. Khan Network of Pakistan has revealed the engagement of 
non-state actors such as nuclear scientists in illegal nuclear activities.2 In a similar vein, 
upon its strained political relations with the USA, North Korea has threatened the USA 
                                                 
1 “Non-proliferation,” The Center for Arms Control and on-Proliferation Web page, accessed 
May 7, 2010, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nonproliferation/.  
 
2 Abdul Qadeer Khan is a Pakistani nuclear scientist. He was the former head of Kahuta Research 
Laboratories in Pakistan, the primary research facility where the Pakistani nuclear weapons program has 
been developed. At the early stages of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, he engaged in the 
establishment of “black market channels” for the Pakistani nuclear acquisition. However In 2004, Abdul 
Qadeer Khan admitted that his black market activities was directed to include other countries' nuclear 
research and development programs as well. He had been involved  in the illegal sale of nuclear 
weapons-related technology to several non-nuclear states, including Iran, North Korea and Libya. 
Following the revelation of the network, Pakistan introduced new export control legislation with an 
attempt to control the nuclear black market activities, with the assistance of the USA and Japan. The 
Pakistani President Musharraf pardoned A. Q. Khan, with an attempt to ensure his assistance in the 
dissolution of the remainder of this nuclear black market network. Despite his cooperation with the 
Pakistani government, Khan is still held under house arrest. This information has been taken from Shi-
Chin Lin, “The A. Q. Khan Revelations and the Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls,” 
Global Security ewswire, accessed July 20, 2011, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_54a.html.          
 
3 
 
to transfer its nuclear technology to other states and non-state actors.3 Lastly, the 
disclosure of the violations of IAEA nuclear safeguard standards by Iran became a 
pressing issue for the survival of the NPT regime.4    
 
 In the recent years, there has been a specific emphasis on the activities in Iran by 
the international community. The preoccupation of the international community with 
the Iranian nuclear program manifested itself first as numerous incentive packages 
offered by the EU to Iran. These incentive packages included extensive trade 
opportunities and cooperation on a wide range of issues including nuclear energy 
technology and regional security. While Iran initially seemed content with these 
packages and temporarily suspended its nuclear program, the IAEA allegations about 
Iranian reporting failures and inspections-related issues led to new problems between 
Iran and the international community. Finally, Iran restarted its nuclear program in late 
2005. After this date, the USA referred the issue to the UN Security Council, which 
passed four rounds of sanctions on Iran to curb its nuclear activities. Apart from these 
UN sanctions, both the USA and the European Union extended unilateral sanctions on 
Iran, specifically targeting the oil sector of Iran. Despite such incentives and tough 
sanctions, Iran has since insisted on its nuclear program.  
 
 The emphasis of the international community on the Iranian nuclear program 
seems paradoxical, given the proliferation instances of Pakistan, Israel and India and of 
North Korea. Although the USA learned about the Israeli nuclear capabilities two years 
after their development, it has turned a blind eye to the Israeli nuclear program. Israel 
has since played “a policy of opacity,” neither refusing nor fully acknowledging its 
nuclear capabilities.5 There have been no sanctions imposed on Israel for its nuclear 
                                                 
3 “Non-proliferation,” http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nonproliferation/.  
 
4 Ibid. 
 
5
  Israel had developed its first nuclear device during the Six-Day War of 1967. The year 1968 was 
of significance for Israel, as the USA established the NPT regime and insisted on Israel to engage in this 
new nuclear order by signing the Treaty. However, Israel refused to sign the Treaty, suggesting that its 
“unique security needs” necessitated Israel to take any caution for its national security including the 
bomb. Still, the USA under Johnson presidency was unaware of the Israeli nuclear capabilities at the 
time. One year later, in 1969, the USA learned about the Israeli nuclear capabilities and the President 
Nixon of the time started negotiations with Israel on the issue. That year, President Nixon and Israeli 
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weapons program. Compared to the Israeli case, the USA adopted a tougher stance 
towards Pakistan. The USA imposed four rounds of unilateral sanctions on Pakistan 
with an attempt to curb its aspiration for nuclear acquisition. The Pakistani nuclear 
weapons activities were followed by a similar path taken by India, who regarded 
nuclear weapons as credible tools for deterrence against Pakistan. When India and 
Pakistan performed nuclear tests in 1998, the USA imposed another sanction on both 
countries. However, the 1998 sanctions targeted at both India and Pakistan as well as 
the three sanctions previously imposed on Pakistan were lifted during George W. Bush 
government in exchange for the Pakistani cooperation with the USA on fight against 
international terrorism in the area.6 Apart from these subsequently lifted sanctions, the 
UN Security Council has passed the Resolution 1772, which banned transfer of nuclear-
related material on Pakistan and India and is still in force. The international community 
adopted a relatively tougher stance towards the North Korean nuclear program when 
compared to other three cases. North Korea withdrew from the NPT regime in 2003.7 
                                                                                                                                              
Prime Minister Golda Meir made a secret agreement, according to which the USA would not insist on 
Israel to sign the NPT, Israel would not disavow its nuclear weapons program but also not declare itself 
as the first holder of nuclear weapons in the region. Israel has never declared its possession of nuclear 
weapons since the Nixon-Golda Meir agreement; however it has not fully acknowledged itself as a non-
nuclear state, either. Known as the policy of “nuclear opacity,” this policy provided Israel with deterrence 
capabilities without risking its political status in the international community, and freed the friendly US-
Israeli relations from the non-proliferation conflict. For a detailed analysis, see Avner Cohen, “Continuity 
and Change in Israeli Strategic Thinking: Reflections in the Wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” eds. 
James A. Russel, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and Policy 
Options in the ew Century (Gordonsville: Palgrave McMillan, 2006), 36-38; and “Israel Profile: 
Nuclear Overview,” uclear Threat Initiative Website, accessed July 21, 2011, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/index.html.     
 
6 India and Pakistan had been subject to sanctions on foreign military and economic assistance by 
the USA. Symington Amendment (1979), Pressler Amendment (1990), and Glenn Amendment (1998), 
which denied either military or economic assistance to Islamabad were lifted by the Bush government in 
2001. Sanctions still in force on Pakistan are the Military Coup Sanction (1999) and Missile Sanctions 
(2000). The multilateral 1998 UN sanction on Pakistan and India banning the transfer of nuclear 
technology to these nations, the Resolution 1772, still  remains in force. Alex Wagner, “Bush Waives 
Nuclear Related Sanctions on India, Pakistan,” Arms Control Association Website, October, 2001, 
accessed 21 July, 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/sanctionsoct01. 
 
7 North Korea signed the IAEA safeguards agreement in 1992. Following several inspection 
problems with the IAEA, it declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This led to a crisis 
between the USA and North Korea, in which the former threatened the latter to impose economic 
sanctions if it does not review its decision to withdraw from the NPT regime. The crisis was resolved in 
1994 with the “Agreed Framework,” according to which North Korea accepted to suspend some of its 
nuclear activities and remain loyal to the NPT regime in exchange for nuclear technology transfers by the 
USA. However, the Agreed Framework proved insufficient in meeting the expectations of both parties. 
This was coupled by subsequent intelligence reports about nuclear activities on some of the North Korean 
nuclear sites. When the USA included North Korea in the list of “axis of evil” states, North Korea 
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The first US response towards North Korean withdrawal was to open trilateral 
diplomatic talks involving North Korea, the USA, and China for the resolution of the 
North Korean nuclear crisis. The negotiations were then extended to include Japan, 
South Korea and Russia, which came to be known as “the Six Party Talks.” However, 
the talks did not yield the intended results on the part of the USA, who imposed 
unilateral sanctions on certain North Korean banks. Immediately after North Korea 
performed its first nuclear test in 2006, the USA could convince the UN Security 
Council to impose multilateral UN sanctions on North Korea. In 2009, North Korea 
declared itself a nuclear state. Apart from a strengthening of 2006 sanctions in 2009, 
there have been no other UN sanctions imposed on North Korea since 2006.8   
 
 When compared to other proliferation instances, the international community's 
concern with the Iranian nuclear program does not seem proportional. Although Iran is 
party to the NPT, it has been subjected to more UN sanctions than India, Pakistan and 
North Korea, who are not NPT members. Moreover, the UN imposed multilateral 
sanctions on other three countries only after they performed open nuclear tests. On the 
other hand, Iran has been subjected to multilateral UN sanctions in the absence of any 
nuclear tests and conclusive evidence about the military nature of its nuclear program. 
Despite its membership to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran sits at the very 
center of strong international pressures to halt its nuclear program and it is presented 
with both “carrots” and “sticks” to do so. Why is the international community headed 
by the USA seems more concerned about the Iranian nuclear program? And why does 
Iran seem so insistent on its nuclear program despite such strong “carrots” and “sticks” 
extended by the international community? This thesis proposes that the international 
community seems to be concerned more about the implications of nuclear weapons on 
                                                                                                                                              
disavowed the Agreed Framework and withdrew from the NPT in 2003. See “North Korea Nuclear 
Profile,” Global Security ewswire, accessed July 23, 2011, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.html.    
 
8 The UN Security Council passed the Resolution 1718 in 2006 and Resolution 1874 in 2009. The 
2006 sanctions included assets freeze; ban on the sale of certain conventional weapons; and on the 
transfer of ballistic-missile related materials. The 2009 sanctions included a ban on “all arms transfers to 
and from North Korea;” a demand from other states “not to provide financial or trade assistance to North 
Korea” if that would assist the North Korean nuclear program; and a freezing of the assets. For a 
comparison of both sanctions, see “North Korea Sanctions: Resolution 1718 Versus 1874,” US 
Department of State Website, accessed  July 19, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/124709.htm.       
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the rise of Iran as a leading regional power and its potential challenge to international 
and the regional status quo, rather than the program's implications on the survival of the 
NPT regime. This is because if the concerns about the compliance to the NPT as an 
international regime were the main motivation for the international community to stop 
Iran, similar measures should have been applied to other dissenters. The singling out of 
Iran implies that there are other concerns at play.  This thesis aims to uncover those by 
emphasizing the possible challenges Iran poses to the status quo powers by grounding 
its analysis in the power transition theory. 
 
 
1.2 The Importance of the Study 
 
   
During the Cold War, the possible eruption of a nuclear holocaust between two 
superpowers was the number one security issue bothering policy makers and the 
academic community alike.  The end of the nuclear superpower rivalry following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to bring an end to such fears. However, this 
prospect proved to be only temporary. First of all, the nuclear club was joined by 
Pakistan and India in late 90s. This was followed by the nuclearization of North Korea 
in year 2009. This increase in the number of nuclear states has not only created a more 
insecure international environment but also sparked fears that many more states may go 
nuclear. 
 
 The nuclearization of additional three nations was only a part of the story in the 
post-Cold War period. As a matter of fact, one novel challenge to nuclear status-quo 
came with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The security environment created in the post-9/11 
period introduced the primacy of non-state actors such as terrorist groups and 
individuals in international relations. In such a security environment, the primary 
security concern came to be the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology by the 
terrorist groups. The decentralized and non-territorial organization of terrorist groups 
challenges the traditional military strategies for retaliation that can only be employed 
against states. Therefore, the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technology by 
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terrorist groups would create an even more unstable and unpredictable security 
environment. Such a fear has been exacerbated by two empirical instances. First, the 
head of International Atomic Energy Agency has stated that every two days “an incident 
involving theft or smuggling of nuclear material” is reported to the Agency, which 
emphasizes the need for member states “to better protect these materials against theft or 
smuggling.”9 Secondly, the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan admitted in 
2004 that he has been involved in “the illicit transfer of nuclear weapons technology to 
Iran, North Korea, Libya and other countries.”10 
 
 Nuclear weapons continue to be a pressing security issue for the international 
community. Only the nature of this security threat has changed. The USA has been 
primarily concerned with the acquisition of nuclear-related technology by the Al-Qaeda. 
Especially after 9/11, “the American perception is that the danger of terrorist 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda acquiring a nuclear bomb or rogue nations joining the 
nuclear weapons club is greater than the nuclear risk between USA exchanging nuclear 
missiles with the former Soviet Union.”11 The nuclear issue is not only among the top 
items of the US Security agenda, but it is regarded as a very important security issue in 
the European Union as well. According to the EU public opinion, nuclear proliferation 
ranks as the number two security threat for the EU citizens after economic crisis.12 
 
 Given the relevance of nuclear weapons for the world community, the Iranian 
nuclear issue is a major security concern, to the resolution of which major powers as 
well as international institutions have been actively engaged. A power transition 
approach to the Iranian nuclear issue could shed light on new conflict resolution 
                                                 
9 “Nuclear Security Summit Hears of Terror Risk,” BBC Online, April 13, 2010, accessed May 12, 
2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8616855.stm. 
 
10 “The A. Q. Khan Revelations and the Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls,” Global 
Security ewswire Website, accessed June 12, 2011, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_54a.html. 
 
11 “The Dallas Morning News Editorial,” cited in “Nuclear Summit Marks Progress,” USA Today, 
April 16, 2010, accessed May 12, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-04-16-
column16_ST3_N.htm.   
 
12 Ivan Krastev, et. al., “The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe,” European Council on Foreign 
Relations Website, October 2010, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/the_spectre_of_a_multipolar_europe_publication, p. 25.  
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opportunities for the conflicting parties. It can create a new avenue for policy makers, 
NGO's and non-proliferation activists to create new agendas for further nuclear 
disarmament. This research will also contribute to the existing International Relations 
literature on Iranian nuclear program by placing the scholarly argument that the Iranian 
nuclear rationale can be explained with reference to its aspiration to become a regional 
dominant power into a theoretical framework. Therefore, the research has implications 
for actual policy making and for academic literature alike.   
 
 
1.3 Literature on uclear Proliferation 
 
 
Since its eruption, the Iranian nuclear crisis has received the attention of scholarly 
community. The literature on Iranian nuclear program can be categorized under four 
rubrics. The first set of arguments follow the neorealist logic that the external security 
environments in the post-9/11 period in the Middle East is both the driver of the Iranian 
nuclear program and of the specific US concerns about the Iranian case.13 The 
neorealist logic provides us with an understanding of the role of external security 
concerns and threat perceptions in increasing the stakes for nuclear acquisition. In the 
Iranian case, the perceived threat from a nuclear Israel as well as from the US military 
presence in the region after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are given as the 
primary rationales of the Iranian nuclear program. Although neorealism makes an 
important contribution to the existing literature, security concerns play an important 
role in other nuclearization cases as well. As such, it does not explain why there is a 
specific concern on Iran. 
     
                                                 
13 See Chris Quillen, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons Policy: Past, Present and Future,” Middle East 
Review of International Affairs 6:2 (June 2002); Ray Takeyh, “Iran's Nuclear Calculations,” World Policy 
Journal 20:2 (June 22, 2003); Scott D. Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs 
(September/October 2006); Efraim Inbar, “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 10:1 (March 2006); Nader Entessar, “Iran's Nuclear Decision-Making Calculus,” 
Middle East Policy 16:2 (Summer 2009); Saideh Lotfian “Threat Perception and Military Planning in 
Iran: Credible Scenarios of Conflict and Opportunities for Confidence Building,” in Military Capacity 
and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan, Iran, ed. Eric Arnett (Oxford, 1997). 
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 The second set of arguments concentrate on the flaw of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime. The selective application of the regime and its creation of a 
legitimate five-membered nuclear club are introduced as the primary reasons for Iran's 
lack of compromise with the international community.14 This neoliberal institutionalist 
literature argues that Iran's lack of full compliance with the NPT regime can be 
explained by the relative cost of compliance in the face of an Israeli and Pakistani 
nuclear threat in the region. Moreover, the perceived double standards put on Iran given 
the other non-compliers increases the Iranian costs for suspending its nuclear program. 
Neoliberal institutionalism has explanatory power in explaining Iran's insistence on its 
nuclear program. However, it fails to explain the duality in the application of the NPT 
regime on the part of the USA. According to the neoliberal institutionalist logic, the 
USA would derive the same benefits from each and every state’s compliance with the 
NPT regime. Therefore, the US focus on Iran at the isolation of others is not explicable 
under neoliberal institutionalist logic.  
 
 The third set of arguments focus on norms, identities and other ideational factors 
driving states towards nuclearization and denuclearization. This constructivist literature 
emphasizes the Iranian Revolutionary discourses such as independence, historical 
victimization due to a colonial past, prestige and self-reliance in the Iranian 
nuclearization context. Moreover, the constructivist literature also focuses on nuclear 
weapons as symbols of scientific and technological development and modernization.15 
                                                 
14 See George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,” Arms 
Control Today 33 (December 2003); Jean du Preez, “Half Full or Half Empty? Realizing the Promise of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Arms Control Today 36, (2006); Chaim Braun and Chrtistopher F. 
Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” International 
Security 29:2 (2004); Henri Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Checking Iran's uclear Ambitions, 
(Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2004); Sepehr Shahshahani, “Politics Under the 
Cover of Law: Can International Law Help Resolve the Iran Nuclear Crisis,” Boston University 
International Law Journal 25 (2007); Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran and the United States: The Nuclear 
Issue,” Middle East Policy 15 (Spring 2008): 19-29. 
 
15 Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Discursive Foundations of Iran's Nuclear Policy,” Security Dialogue 
38:4 (December 2007): 527; Chubin, Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and ational Security,  
(New York: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 74. Also for a list of literature 
mentioning the role of norms and identity in Iran's nuclear program, see George Perkovich, ‘Dealing 
With Iran's Nuclear Challenge’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  (April 28, 2003):1-16; 
Jahangir Amuzegar, “Nuclear Iran: Perils and  Prospects,” Middle East Policy 8 (Summer 2006): 90-112; 
Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear 
Power,” The Middle East Journal 60 (Spring 2006): 207-32; Kai-Henrik Barth, “Scientists, Clerics and 
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The constructivist literature would be expected to treat the US emphasis on the Iranian 
nuclear issue with reference to the existence of international non-proliferation norms, 
notably the NPT regime. In this respect, the USA might insist on Iran to suspend its 
nuclear program, as any state's defection from the NPT regime would be a blow to the 
regime's credibility. Although constructivist accounts provide us with valuable insight 
on the role of nuclear symbols as possible dynamics behind Iran's nuclear program, it 
fails to account for the duality of the USA in imposing the NPT not to Israel, India and 
Pakistan, but to Iran.     
 
 The fourth set of arguments take into account the role of domestic politics in 
driving states towards nuclearization. A considerable amount of literature on Iran 
focuses on the implications of domestic politics and the role of policy-making elite on 
the nuclear program.16 The role of the Supreme Leader, the president, nuclear scientists 
and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are referred as the determiners of the Iranian 
nuclear policy. Similarly, there is also research concentrating on the political economy 
aspect of nuclearization, which places the domestic political groups' response to 
internationalization at the center of analysis.17 The domestic politics literature provides 
                                                                                                                                              
Nuclear Decision Making In Iran,” (Presentation in Georgetown University, June 22, 2007); Mahdi 
Mohammad Nia, “Understanding Iran’s Foreign Policy: An Application of Holistic Constructivism,” 
Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations 9:1 (Spring 2010); Caroline F. Ziemke, “The 
National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counter-Proliferation Perspective,” in The Coming 
Crisis: uclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests and World Order, ed. Victor A. Utgoff, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2000), 89. 
 
16
 Caroline F. Ziemke et al., Leadership Dynamics and uclear Decision-Making in Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005); Fariboz Mokhtari, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 
Presidency: What Does Iran Really Want?” American Foreign Policy Interests 28 (2006); Schmuel Bar et 
al., “Iran's Nuclear Decision-Making Under Ahmadinejad” (Draft paper presented at Eight Herzliya 
Conference on the Balance of Israel's National Security, “Israel at Sixty: Tests of Endurance,” The 
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Lauder School of Governmet, Diplomacy and Strategy, Insittute for 
Policy and Strategy, January 20-23, 2008); Kai-Henrik Barth, “Scientists, Clerics and Nuclear Decision 
Making In Iran” (Presentation in Georgetown University, June 22, 2007);  Chubin, Whither Iran? 
Reform, Domestic Politics and ational Security; Chen Kane, “Nuclear Decision-Making In Iran: A Rare 
Glimpse,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief  5 (May 2006);  
Chubin, Iran's uclear Ambitions (Washington DC. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006);  
Charles C. Mayer, “National Security to Nationalist Myth: Why Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons” (MA 
Thesis Submitted to the Security Studies to Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2004); Jahangir 
Amuzegar, ‘Nuclear Iran: Perils and  Prospects,’ 90-112. 
 
17 See Etel Solingen, uclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
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a powerful explanation for the Iranian insistence on the nuclear program despite all 
carrots and sticks targeted at it. However, it does not explain why the international 
community is especially concerned for the Iranian case.  
 
 An alternative explanation for the Iranian nuclear program is the Iranian 
ambition to become a leading power in the Middle East region. Although there are 
scholars who link Iran's nuclear program to having a greater say in the regional affairs, 
such scholarship is devoid of a proper theoretical framework.18 This niche can be 
addressed by a study focusing on the implications of the Iranian nuclear program for 
international and regional status-quo. In this respect, it is the contention of this thesis 
that power transition theory can provide us with a theoretical perspective that could be 
used to analyze the impact of the Iranian nuclear program on global and regional 
balances of power. 
 
 Power transition theory is based on A.F.K Organski's seminal work World 
Politics in 1958. In contrast to the neorealist assumption that the international system is 
marked by anarchy, power transition theory assumes the existence of a hierarchy in the 
international arena. Organski depicts this hierarchy like a pyramid, where a global 
hegemon sits at the top and less powerful states are scattered at the lower ends. The 
hegemon sets the rules of international interaction. Given the existence of the USA as 
the dominant power in the international arena, it projects its domestic way of extracting 
resources to the international system as the status-quo. At the political, economical and 
ideological levels, the US-defined status-quo is visible in its promotion of democracy, 
human rights, open liberal economy and international institutions. The USA often 
makes use of political and economic incentives as well as sanctions to make other states 
align with the global stability. When these are challenged, then the global stability is 
challenged, as a result of which the USA resorts to force. The states which benefit from 
the international status-quo set by the USA are stabilized under the American 
hegemony. However, a dissatisfied power which does not benefit much from this status 
quo may challenge the dominant power. If that dissatisfied state achieves power parity 
                                                 
18 See Bruno Tetrais, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis,” in The Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European 
Strategy for the Greater Middle East, eds. Ivo Daalder, et al. (New York: The Brookings Institution, 
2006), 26; Chubin, Iran's uclear Ambitions,16.  
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with the dominant power, an armed conflict may erupt. While power parity among two 
dominant powers might lead to stability according to the neorealist theory, the power 
transition theory argues that power parity between a dominant power and a dissatisfied 
challenger leads to armed conflict. As such, dissatisfaction by one rising power with the 
status quo set by the hegemon and the achieved power parity between the two leads to 
an armed conflict.  
 
 This thesis argues that the rationale behind the Iranian nuclear program is its 
ambition to become a regional power in the Middle East. A rising GDP level, large 
population, rich oil reserves and a nuclear program renders Iran as a possible candidate 
to acquire regional dominant power status. A rising Iran with nuclear weapons could 
challenge Israel as the sole nuclear power holder in the region and as the major US ally. 
Moreover, a rising nuclear Iran would also be problematic given the US presence and 
US interests in the region. However, the sole rise in Iranian power does not determine 
its ambition to achieve a power transition. Iran is dissatisfied with the international 
economic, political, ideological and nuclear status-quo. The USA is aware both of the 
implications of a weapons-oriented nuclear program on the further rise of Iranian power 
and of the Iranian dissatisfaction with the status-quo. Due to its implications for a 
global and regional power transitions, the international community backed by the USA 
places much emphasis on curbing the Iranian nuclear program. The empirical analysis 
indicates that there is a correlation between the level of Iranian dissatisfaction and on 
the type and harshness of the response Iran gets from the international community. 
 
 
1.4 The Methodology 
 
 
Given the existence of two research questions, there are two dependent variables to be 
dealt with in this thesis. The first dependent variable is the international community’s 
specific concern about the Iranian nuclear program. The second dependent variable is 
the Iranian insistence on its nuclear program. Each of these two dependent variables 
will be explained by two independent variables used in power transition analysis, which 
13 
 
is relative power and dissatisfaction with the status-quo.  
 
 Power transition theory places much emphasis on domestic economic 
development level in explaining nations' rise in power. A high GDP is assumed to lead 
to more military build-up. Therefore, this thesis measures the relative power variable 
through GDP, military expenditures, military capabilities, size of the army, population 
and oil reserves. As such, statistical data will be used for the measurement of relative 
power. On the other hand, there has been a scholarly confusion among power transition 
theorists on the measurement of the dissatisfaction variable. While some scholars use 
the similarity of alliance portfolio as a measure of dissatisfaction, others concentrate on 
domestic systems similarity. Still others adopt a multiple approach to dissatisfaction, 
merging many factors such as ideological differences, satisfaction with the international 
norms and arms build-up. Given the strong relevance of domestic politics in Iran's 
nuclear strategy, this thesis takes the domestic systems similarity as one measurement 
criteria of dissatisfaction. In a similar vein, dissatisfaction with the international norms, 
membership to international and regional organizations and arms build-up will also be 
discussed in the same context. 
 
 
1.5 Design of the Study 
 
 
 
 
In line with the above mentioned scope and purposes of the thesis, the next chapter will 
provide an empirical account of the nuclear order. The first part of the chapter will give 
a historical background of the nuclear non-proliferation regime with a special emphasis 
on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Following a brief section on the aims of the 
NPT, the successes and failures of the regime in the changing security environment of 
the post-Cold War and of the post-9/11 periods will be discussed. The final section of 
the chapter will be allotted to a historical account of the Iranian program, including the 
initiation of the nuclear program under Shah's rule, the suspension of the program with 
the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the restart of the program in the post Iran-Iraq War of 
1980-1988 and the latest Iranian nuclear crisis in 2002. This empirical background will 
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form the basis for a theoretical discussion.  
 
 The third chapter will review the theories of nuclear proliferation. Major 
international relations theories including neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, 
constructivism and domestic politics will be discussed in this context. An evaluation of 
the strength and limitations of these theories in explaining the Iranian nuclear program 
is central to this chapter. Afterwards, power transition theory will be presented as an 
alternative theory to explain nuclear proliferation. 
 
 The fourth chapter will apply the power transition perspective to the Iranian 
nuclear program. The first part of the chapter will review the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 
security environments and power balances in the Middle East. The chapter will then 
discuss the changes in military balances in the post-9/11 period, with a specific 
emphasis on GDP levels, military expenditures, military capabilities of relevant nations, 
size of the army, population and oil reserves. Afterwards, the chapter will talk about the 
US led status-quo both at the regional and global level. The following section will 
evaluate the Iranian stance to this status-quo. Domestic systems similarity, membership 
to international and regional organizations, dissatisfaction with the international norms, 
and military build-up will be taken as the key independent variables to evaluate the 
Iranian dissatisfaction with the US-led status-quo. Finally, policy options taken by the 
US as the dominant power in the face of a dissatisfied Iran will be explored. 
 
 The last chapter will be the conclusion of the thesis. The final chapter will 
summarize the findings of the study, and will discuss the practical and theoretical 
implications of this study for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
A HISTORICAL ACCOUT OF THE IRAIA UCLEAR ISSUE 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter will provide a historical background of the Iranian nuclear program,  
which will form the empirical basis of a theoretical discussion to be pursued in the 
coming chapters. The first sections will be devoted to an historical overview of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. A section will be spared to the successes and failures 
of the non-proliferation regime. Then the development of the Iranian nuclear program 
during different periods of the Iranian state will be explored. Finally, the Iranian nuclear 
crisis of 2002 and the subsequent relations between Iran and the international 
community will be discussed. 
 
 
2.2 The Historical Background of the on-Proliferation Regime 
 
 
 
Nuclear non-proliferation regime is an international initiative designed to prevent yet 
non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons technology and information. The 
USA, which had then the monopoly over nuclear technology, was the first country to 
raise its concerns about the spread of nuclear technology due to its very recent memory 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The initial US nuclear policy can be described as denial, 
where the US chose to restrict its domestic nuclear firms to share any nuclear 
information with other countries. However, the Soviet acquisitions of nuclear capability 
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in 1949 lead the US to drop its policy of denial and share its nuclear information with 
its close ally, the UK.19 Seeing the commercial success of British firms from nuclear 
technology transfer, the USA adopted the policy of nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes and nuclear non-proliferation starting from 1946.20  
 
 The first US non-proliferation effort was the Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch 
Plans of 1946. In December 1945, representatives from three nuclear power holders, the 
USA, the Soviet Union and the UK agreed on the creation of a UN body to promote 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes given the huge destructive capability of nuclear 
weapons.21 For this purpose, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) 
was created in January 1946. The members of a special advisory committee in the US 
Department of State - Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the Chairman of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority David Lilienthal - issued a report to be presented to the 
UNAEC, which stated the need to create an international authority that would monitor 
the use of fissile materials on all nuclear facilities and issue licenses to countries who 
want to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.22 The plan also recognized 
the need for the US to destroy its own nuclear capabilities.23    
 
 Fearing that destroying US nuclear capabilities would be risky in the face of 
tense relations with the Soviet Union, President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch as 
the American representative to UNAEC and demanded him to rearrange “the Acheson-
Lilienthal Plan” in a way that the US would not destroy its nuclear capabilities until the 
Soviet Union assures them of its inability to acquire nuclear weapons.24 Accordingly, 
the new “Baruch Plan” called for the creation of an agency under the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
19 Chao and Niblett quoted in Arzu-Celalifer Ekinci, Đran ükleer Krizi (Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 
2009), 13.  
 
20 Celalifer-Ekinci, Đran ükleer Krizi, 14. 
 
21 “Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch Plans of 1946,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the 
Historian Website, accessed  March 12, 2011, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/BaruchPlans. 
 
22 Ibid.  
 
23 Ibid.  
 
24 Ibid.  
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UN Security Council, which would possess the sole right to inspect the development of 
nuclear capabilities, be exempt from the vetoes of UNSC permanent members, be 
supported by military forces and perform inspections in the facilities of non-nuclear 
states.25 Moreover, the plan stipulated the start of inspections in nuclear states including 
the Soviet Union for the US destruction of its own nuclear capabilities.26 Unfortunately, 
the Baruch Plan failed when faced with strong Soviet opposition.27  
 
 In contrast to Truman's protectionist policy on the transfer of nuclear 
information and technology, President Dwight Eisenhower opted for a nuclear policy 
prioritizing nuclear assistance to other countries that wish to acquire nuclear energy 
peaceful purposes. In his “Atoms for Peace” speech addressed at the UN General 
Assembly in December 1953, he proposed to share nuclear technology and knowledge 
for peaceful purposes with other states through the establishment of an international 
agency.28 The speech led to international negotiations for such an agency, which ended 
up with the establishment of The International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) in 
1957.29 Nuclear weapons states started providing non-nuclear states with nuclear 
reactors for research purposes and with nuclear training.30 One reason for the US to 
focus on the peaceful energy aspect of nuclear technology was “to offset the 
unfavorable American image as created through the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
incidents.”31 Therefore, the US sought to promote the “uses” of nuclear technology for 
mankind, such as electricity generation.32 However, the nuclear technology used in 
                                                 
25 Bunn, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current problems.”  
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 “Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch Plans of 1946.” 
 
28 “Atoms For Peace,” (Speech delivered before The General Assembly of the United Nations on 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, December 8, 1953), accessed March 10, 2011, 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Atomsforpeace.shtml. 
 
29 Bunn, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current problems,”  
 
30 Celalifer-Ekinci, Đran ükleer Krizi, 14. 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid. 
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energy generation facilities for peaceful purposes could also be used for producing 
plutonium to be used in nuclear weapons. There was a blurring line between peaceful 
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. 
 
 
 2.2.1 The uclear on-Proliferation Treaty 
 
 
The share of nuclear technology had exacerbated the US concerns about nuclear non-
proliferation due to the blurring line between nuclearization for peaceful energy 
purposes and for military purposes. The Soviet Union, UK and France had already gone 
nuclear by 1963. The Department of Defense in 1963 decided on a list of 14 states 
which could get nuclear capability in less than a decade, by looking at their nuclear 
motivations.33 The states on the list were “major industrialized Group of Seven allies of 
the United States plus China, Czechoslovakia, India, Israel, Poland, and Sweden.”34 
While both the Soviet Union and the US compromised on the need to take actions 
against such nuclearization threats, they had diverged on the means.35 While the US 
proposed a ”multilateral naval force with nuclear weapons” under NATO command, the 
Soviet Union demanded the US to break existing treaties with its allies granting US the 
permission to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory to protect them against any 
possible Soviet attack.36 
 
 Following negotiations under the UN as initiated by Ireland, both the Soviet 
Union and the USA relinquished their previous demands and submitted a nuclear non-
proliferation draft treaty to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in January 1968.37 
                                                 
33 Bunn, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current problems,”  
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Celalifer-Ekinci, Đran ükleer Krizi, p. 16. 
 
36 Bunn, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current problems.”   
 
37 “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Chronology,” Federation of American Scientists Website, 
accessed March 10, 2011, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm.  
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62 countries including the US, UK, Soviet Union signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in July 1968, whose primary aim was to hinder the further spread of nuclear 
weapons.38  
 
 
 2.2.2 The Goals and Principles of the PT 
 
 
 
The goals and principles of Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty can be categorized under 
three pillars, which are nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the right to 
peaceful use of nuclear technology.39 According to the Treaty, the five nuclear countries 
at the time, the USA, UK, Russia, China and France, will retain their nuclear 
capabilities; will refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states; and 
will not provide non-nuclear states with any technological assistance to acquire, 
develop and control nuclear weapons.40 The Treaty stipulates all non-nuclear powers 
not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.41 The Article IV of the Treaty 
recognizes the right of every nation to pursue nuclear energy research and nuclear 
energy production for peaceful purposes.42 However, the Treaty obligates all non-
nuclear states to succumb to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which 
provide Agency with the authority to monitor and control all the nuclear activities in 
non-nuclear states in order to ensure that they are producing and using nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes only.43 Although five states are given the nuclear 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Celalifer-Ekinci, Đran Nükleer Krizi, 16.  
 
40 “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” International Atomic Energy Agency 
Website, accessed March 8, 2011, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf.  
 
41 “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists 
Website, accessed March 8, 2011, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/.   
 
42 “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf. 
 
43 “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/. 
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monopoly, Article VI of the Treaty encourages these five states “to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”44  
  
 The Treaty came into force with the signature and ratification by 40 countries in 
1970. 187 countries are party to the Treaty as of 2011. Still, the non-proliferation 
regime as created by the NPT has not been without outliers. While the Article VI of the 
Treaty encourages five nuclear states to gradually reduce and finally drop their nuclear 
capabilities, this provision is not binding. Believing that this led to the creation of a 
hierarchy among countries as “nuclear haves” and “nuclear have-nots,” some states 
have never signed the Treaty. 45 India did not sign the Treaty on the grounds that it 
created nuclear “double standards” and “discrimination.”46 Similarly, emphasizing the 
security problems with India, Pakistan also refrained from signing the Treaty.47 Israel 
has never become a party to the Treaty either, and is believed to posses up to 200 
nuclear weapons today.48 North Korea has been the first state to benefit from Article X 
in 2003, which gives states the right to withdraw from the Treaty in case of 
“extraordinary events that jeopardize the supreme interests of its country.”49  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,”  
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf  
 
45 Celalifer-Ekinci, Đran ükleer Krizi, 17. 
 
46 Ibid.  
 
47 Ibid.  
 
48 “Israel, Nuclear Weapons,” uclear on-Proliferation Treaty Tutorial Website, accessed March 
9, 2011, http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_15_israel.html.  
 
49 “North Korea Nuclear Activities,” uclear on-Proliferation Treaty Tutorial Website, accessed 
March 9, 2011,  http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_16_north_korea.html  Also see 
Article X of NPT in “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf.  
21 
 
 2.2.3 Successes and Failures of the PT 
 
 
The NPT has so far accomplished much in setting and consolidating the non-
proliferation regime. Today, 187 states are signatory to NPT, with the exception of 
India, Israel and Pakistan and North Korea.50 It is estimated that if it were not for the 
existence of NPT, there would now be “30 or more countries with nuclear weapons.”51  
 
 Still, the success of the NPT regime does not preclude the fact that the regime 
has also suffered major challenges. Some countries which were not considered to 
acquire nuclear weapons or to work on nuclear weapons technology proved to have 
acquired nuclear weapons or attempted to do so. In this respect, South Africa, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine had nuclear weapons; and Argentina and Brazil had a nuclear 
program.52 However, all these countries gave up their nuclear weapons and stopped 
their nuclear programs with security guarantees and incentives provided by the USA 
and Russia.53 Although the nuclear threat was appeased by the non-proliferation of 
these countries for a couple of years, the memory of the nuclear threat has been revived 
in the new security environment created after 9/11 terrorist attacks. In this context, “the 
theft or sale of various nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union states; nuclear 
black market activity such as the network operated by A.Q. Khan out of Pakistan; 
threats by North Korea to share nuclear technology with states or non-state actors 
hostile to the US; and violations of IAEA nuclear safeguard standards by Iran” have 
become main security threats in the post-9/11 period.54  
                                                 
50 Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT 
States in the Nonproliferation Regime,”  Arms Control Today (December  2003), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman.  
 
51 Bunn, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current problems.” 
 
52 Ibid.  
 
53 For further detail, see Bunn “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: History and Current 
problems.” 
 
54 “Non-proliferation,” The Center for Arms Control and on-Proliferation Web page, accessed 
May 10, 2010,  http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nonproliferation/.  
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 2.2.4 uclear Inspections in the Framework of PT 
 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the responsibility to monitor and 
control all the nuclear-related activities in non-nuclear countries to ensure that they are 
for peaceful purposes only and in compliance with the NPT. NPT obligates all non-
nuclear states to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, under 
which states “declare” their nuclear activities, facilities and material.55 IAEA confirms 
the nuclear information provided by non-nuclear states through further inspections and 
surveillance.56 However, states' declaration of their nuclear facilities, material and 
activities has become a major issue for the NPT regime, as the IAEA officials were only 
allowed to inspect facilities which the state deemed fit.57  
 
 IAEA's inspection problem first arose during the first Iraqi War, when secret 
Iraqi nuclear facilities were discovered.58 The problem was further consolidated by 
North Korea, who declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT regime in 1993 and 
evaded IAEA inspections thereafter.59 The need to strengthen the IAEA's inspection 
authority resulted in the introduction of the Additional Protocol in 1998. The Additional 
Protocol provides IAEA with the authority to do inspections on a state's nuclear sites or 
other sites where nuclear activities are supposed to be performed without prior 
notification.60 However, the introduction of the Additional Protocol has not wholly 
eliminated the inspection challenges as its signature is voluntary.61   
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2.3 The Iranian uclear Program 
 
 
 2.3.1 Iranian uclear Program Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran 
 
 
The Iranian nuclear program is the product of Iranian strategic relations with the US, 
which started under the rule of Shah in the late 1940s. The USA is the first country to 
provide Iran with scientific and technological assistance for the build up of a nuclear 
program. The US assistance can be attributed to increasing US interests in the Middle 
East, particularly “the strategic value of the oil reserves” and “the necessity of 
containing Soviet expansionism.”62 In the aftermath of World War II, Iran, along with 
Turkey, Greece and Italy, was listed by the US as a country to be turned towards the 
West and to be protected against Soviet expansionism.63 This regional conjuncture was 
accompanied by domestic economic problems in Iran throughout the 1950s, which 
resulted in economic, military and technical assistance to Iran during Truman's 
presidency.64 The US assistance to Iran was prolonged during Eisenhower's presidency 
as well, who devised what was to be called “Eisenhower Doctrine” as a response to the 
need to strengthen the “Northern tier” of non-Communist Middle Eastern countries 
facing Soviet threat through economic assistance and military guarantees.65  
 
 Iran was introduced to nuclear science and technology in these very years when 
the US economic, military and technological relations were intensified.66 These years 
coincide also with Eisenhower's efforts to share nuclear science and technology with 
non-nuclear countries through his “Atoms for Peace” project in 1953. The USA 
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engaged in nuclear science and technology transfers to Iran, which can be explained by 
the US desire to augment its “share in the burgeoning nuclear market.”67 Under 
Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace” program, two countries started negotiating a 
cooperation agreement for the manufacture of peaceful nuclear energy, which would 
open the Iranian market to US investment in Iranian nuclear industry.68  
 
 In 1967, Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), which has been one of Iran's 
chief nuclear facilities, was opened in Tehran University.69 The facility possessed a 5 
megawatt nuclear research reactor and could produce up to 600 grams of plutonium on 
a yearly basis.70 Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, thereby acquiring 
the inalienable right to have access to peaceful nuclear energy technology.71 The 
regional developments in the early 1970's also shaped the Iranian plans to accelerate its 
nuclear program. In this respect, the successive US President Nixon adopted the policy 
of “strengthening Iran in order to deter Soviet designs in the region,” which would be 
called the “Nixon Doctrine.”72 Other regional developments at the time were the 
conflict between Israel and the Arab countries that erupted in 1973 and the subsequent 
oil crisis that “led to a significant increase in Iranian economy.”73 Moreover, Stanford 
Research Institute provided a study suggesting that Iran's electricity need would amount 
up to 20.000 megawatt by 1990.74 As a result of these regional developments and a 
boom in Iranian economy following the oil crisis, Shah declared his intent to expand the 
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Iranian nuclear program to cover a 23.000 megawatt nuclear capacity by 2000.75 To this 
end, the Shah founded the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974.76  
 
 The Shah's willingness to expand Iran's nuclear energy power by cooperating 
with US companies for the establishment of several nuclear reactors in Iran would help 
the US to “recover the cost of oil that it was buying from Iran.”77 However, the Iranian 
nuclear market was not only open to the US investors. As a matter of fact, Iran 
negotiated a deal with Kraftwerk Union of West Germany to build two reactors in 
Bushehr, which would produce 1200 megawatt electricity.78  Another Iranian deal to 
produce electricity was with the French company Framatome for the build-up of two 
900 megawatt reactors.79 With 10-year French-Iranian cooperation for the build-up of 
five additional nuclear reactors on the Iranian territory amounting up to 4 billion US 
dollars, France became “Iran's largest industrial partner.”80 In 1974, Iran invested $1 
billion in uranium enrichment plant owned by Eurodif, a multilateral consortium of 
France, Belgium, Spain and Italy.81 Apart from these nuclear investment agreements, 
the Shah also sent hundreds of students to various US and European universities to 
study nuclear physics, so that the technical and scientific nuclear cadre needed to 
operate these facilities would be formed.82 
 
 In May 1974, the US Atomic Energy Commission made negotiations with Iran 
                                                 
75  Kibaroğlu, “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs,” 213-214. 
 
76 For a detailed account of AEOI, see Ghannadi Maragheh, “Atomic Energy Organization of 
Iran,” (Presentation in World Nuclear Energy Association Annual Symposium, London September 4-6, 
2002).  
 
77 Sahimi, “Iran's Nuclear Program Part I: Its History.”  
 
78 “Iran's Nuclear Program,” Iran Watch, September 2004, accessed May 21, 2011, 
http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/wponac-nuclearhistory-0904.htm.  
 
79  Ibid.  
 
80  Celalifer-Ekinci, Đran ükleer Krizi, 33.  
 
81 “Iran's Nuclear Program,” http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/wponac-nuclearhistory-0904.htm.  
 
82 Darhorin quoted in Celalifer-Ekinci, Đran ükleer Krizi, 33.  
 
26 
 
to build up new facilities in Iran for uranium enrichment.83 The deal was expanded 
during the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Tehran in November 1974, 
which resulted in $15 billion cooperation agreement between Iran and US in March 
1975 for the establishment of eight nuclear reactors with a capacity of 8,000 mega-
watt.84 Nuclear cooperation continued during Carter's presidency, who signed an 
agreement with Iran, giving it “the most favored nation” status, and the US-Iran 
Nuclear Agreement, which was aimed to manage of transfer of nuclear material to Iran 
in 1978.85  
 
 There are various accounts of Shah's intentions for the build-up of nuclear 
bomb. On the one hand, Shah's accounts suggest that the Iranian nuclear program was 
only for peaceful purposes and he was not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons at 
the time, as USA had promised to provide Iran with a good amount of conventional 
weapons.86 On the other hand, the founder of AEOI, Dr. Akbar Etemad, suggested that 
Iran had bought uranium from South Africa in 1970's and had been engaged in 
plutonium extraction experiments, which would only be used in nuclear bombs.87 Still, 
all the Iranian nuclear activities supported by both European states and the US came to 
a halt with the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. 
 
 
 2.3.2 Iranian uclear Program after the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran 
 
 
The US-Iranian relations underwent dramatic changes with the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 
as a result of which Iran came to be regarded as a “hostile” country rather than a US 
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ally.88 The USA not only broke the bilateral nuclear agreements, but also engaged in a 
“policy of denial,” where she encouraged European states to break their deals with Iran 
and discouraged other countries from transferring any nuclear technology to Iran.89  
 
 The first Supreme Leader of Iran, Imam Khomeini, started an anti-
Westernization and “anti-modernization” project in both domestic and foreign policy.90 
This was also evident in the nuclear field. While the 90 % of the Bushehr-1 reactor and 
the construction of 50 % of the Bushehr-2 facility were complete by the Revolution, the 
clerical regime rejected to continue with the military and technological modernization 
after the Revolution.91 As a matter of fact, all nuclear facilities were left to degradation, 
all AEOI projects were canceled, the Bushehr was proposed to be transformed into a 
grain sail and a massive brain drain of nuclear scientists occurred.92  
 
 The first attempts to resume the Iranian nuclear program are the result of the 
eight-year-long Iraq-Iran War, which implied the possible advantages of modern 
military and nuclear technologies for Iran during the war.93 Iraq had bombed Iran's 
civilian population, nuclear facilities and industrial cities during the war, leading to a 
great damage on the part of Iran.94 Facing the colossal destruction caused by war, the 
clerical regime soon realized that the possession of modern military technology, and 
possibly the possession of nuclear weapons would have discouraged Iraq to engage in a 
war with Iran.95 Apart from the Iran-Iraq War, the severe post-revolutionary energy 
crisis also contributed to Iranian plans to resume its nuclear program. While the 
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population was rising rapidly, the oil production decreased, leading to a rise in domestic 
consumption.96 By resuming its nuclear program, Iran was planning to meet the 
domestic demand for energy through nuclear energy and to export oil to other 
countries.97   
 
 The president of the time Hashemi Rafsanjani's first attempt to revive the 
nuclear program was to turn to the German Kraftwerk Union to finish the uncompleted 
Bushehr project. Iran asked Germany to allow Kraftwerk Union to deliver nuclear 
reactor materials and technical documentation, which it had already paid for before the 
Revolution.98 Still, the German government refused to allow for the delivery of the 
nuclear material to Iran.99 Afterwards, Rafsanjani turned to French Framatome, for a 
deal either on two reactors with a capacity of 950 mega-watt at Darkhovin or on the 
construction of the a research center at Isfahan, which was also refused by the French 
government.100 The non-cooperative attitude of both European countries can be 
attributed to the pressures of the USA, who had broken all economic, political and 
military ties with Iran after the Revolution.101 A consortium of Argentinean, German 
and Spanish firms proposed Iran to complete the Bushehr-1 project in late 80s.102 
However, this project was never realized due to the US pressure. 
 
 Unable to get the expected assistance from its former European partners, Iran 
turned its face to the East. Iran signed a nuclear agreement with Pakistan in 1987, 
according to which 39 Iranian nuclear scientists could have the chance to advance their 
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nuclear skills on Pakistani facilities and reactors.103 Iran signed a similar deal with 
Argentina to supply uranium enriched up to 20 % and to allow the training of Iranian 
nuclear scientists and technicians at an Argentinean nuclear institute.104 Despite these 
cooperation agreements with Pakistan and Argentina, the biggest nuclear partners for 
Iran during 90s did not happen to be Pakistan and Argentina, but China and Russia. 
  
 China first provided Iran with uranium hexafluoride, which is used in uranium 
enrichment activities.105 In 1991, both countries made a deal, according to which China 
would provide Iran with 20 mega-watt research reactors.106 Similarly, both countries 
signed another agreement in 1994, which covered the construction of a 300 mega-watt 
hydraulic nuclear reactor near Tehran.107 The conversion and production facilities at 
Isfahan are known to have been completed also by Chinese aid.108 Similar to the French 
and German cases, China also felt the US pressure to deter or cancel all these nuclear 
agreements with Iran. As a matter of fact, China decided not to sell the hexafluoride 
conversion system to Iran, in exchange for US guarantees to allow its nuclear 
companies to sell nuclear technology to China.109 Still, despite various US pressures on 
China, Iran and China maintained their nuclear cooperation even after the Iranian 
nuclear crisis of 2002. 
 
 Iran signed its first deal to complete the Bushehr facility with the Soviet Union 
in 1990; however, the deal could not be fully realized due to financial problems.110 
Then in 1995, Iran and Russia signed another agreement with the Russian Ministry of 
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Atomic Energy for the completion of Bushehr reactors.111 According to the agreement, 
Russia would construct light water reactors of 1000 mega-watt each in Bushehr, engage 
in a scientific and technological cooperation with Iran and Iran would send 20-30 
nuclear physics students at the graduate level to Russia on a yearly basis.112 Moreover, 
both countries also made a deal to construct a uranium enrichment facility with gas 
centrifuge, which faced with the hard opposition by the USA.113 However, the USA 
could not convince Russia to break the deal, as Russia needed the money to be derived 
from this agreement due to its post-Soviet period financial problems.114 Unable to deter 
Russia from the agreement, the USA started claiming that the plutonium to be produced 
in the reactors as well as the technical know-how the Iranian scientists would acquire 
on the facilities would be used by Iran to develop nuclear weapons.115 Still, none of 
these pressures completely deterred Russia from nuclear cooperation with Iran. The 
Russian-Iranian cooperation was maintained in the post-2002 period as well, when 99 
% of the Bushehr facility was completed.116  
 
 The historical account of the Iranian nuclear program indicates that Iran first 
engaged in the peaceful energy program during the Shah era with US backing. 
Germany, France and the USA were the primary nuclear partners of Iran. However, the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution changed the course of the program. The break of political, 
economic and military relations with the US and its European allies also had negative 
implications for the Iranian nuclear program. However, the conjunctural changes within 
the region pushed Iran for a resumption of the nuclear activities after the Iran-Iraqi War. 
While scientifically and technically supporting Iran for peaceful nuclear energy 
production before the Islamic Revolution, the USA engaged in a propaganda of labeling 
Iranian effort for the revival of its nuclear program as an effort for nuclear 
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weaponization. Such US claims took on a serious tone starting from 2002, when CIA 
issued a report claiming that Iran had achieved uranium enrichment capacity needed for 
nuclear weapons production.117   
 
 
2.4 The Iranian uclear Crisis in 2002 
 
 
 2.4.1 The Disclosure of Secret uclear Facilities in 2002 
 
 
In 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, who is an active dissident of the Iranian government, a 
former spokesperson of the US office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran118, 
and a former member of People's Mujahedin of Iran119, revealed in a press conference 
held in Washington D.C that Iran had secret nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak. 
According to Jafarzadeh's speech, the Natanz facility contained nuclear enrichment 
technology and the Arak facility contained a heavy water reactor, both of which could 
be used for the development of nuclear weapons. The revelation of both facilities was 
an opportunity for the USA to support its claims that Iran was building nuclear 
weapons. Upon an investigation on the satellite photos of Natanz and Arak, USA 
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concluded that Iran had nuclear intentions surpassing the attainment of peaceful 
energy.120  Apart from the USA, the initial third party actors to be involved with the 
crisis were IAEA and the three major European powers - Germany, France and the UK - 
also known as the EU-3. All three actors displayed differing strategies regarding the 
solution of the crisis. While the USA was inclined to use hard power methods such as 
military intervention, the European countries favored diplomatic negotiations. Still, the 
firsthand authority to address the issue happened to be IAEA. 
 
 
 2.4.2 IAEA Inspections 
 
  
Iran had declared its liability to the non-proliferation regime by ratifying the NPT in 
1970. Accordingly, IAEA had the authority to inspect and monitor Iran's nuclear 
activities to ensure that all nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes only. The Iranian 
nuclear crisis following the revelation of formerly undeclared Natanz and Arak facilities 
in 2002 was a secret facility crisis, as Iran presumably had not notified IAEA of the 
Natanz and Arak facilities as a part of its responsibilities specified by the safeguards 
agreement. As a result, IAEA attended the issue through its visits to Iran and its 
inspections of both facilities. The agency responsible for performing negotiations with 
IAEA at the time in Iran was the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, for at the very 
beginning of the crisis, the issue was regarded to be a technical issue rather than a 
political one.    
 
 On February 25, 2003, IAEA Director General ElBaradei paid his first 
inspection visit to Iranian Arak and Natanz facilities. ElBaradei reported that he was 
“taken aback” by the technological and scientific advancement in the Iranian nuclear 
program and confirmed that there had been a breach of NPT.121 Following this 
inspection visit, ElBaradei and Iran agreed to negotiate the signing of Additional 
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Protocol, which would provide IAEA with the authority also to monitor and inspect all 
declared and undeclared nuclear sites without prior notification.122 However, it should 
be noted that while the IAEA focused on Iran's neglectfulness in notifying IAEA about 
its nuclear activities, the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and IAEA confirm the 
opposite. According to the agreement, Iran was not necessarily responsible for notifying 
IAEA of the construction of the Natanz facility. Iran was only responsible for notifying 
IAEA of the existence of Natanz facility 180 days prior to the transfer of any nuclear 
material to the facility.123 Therefore, the mere existence of the Natanz facility did not 
necessarily mean a breach of the Agreement, although it was reflected to be so by the 
international community.124   
 
 Iran pursued a mildly conciliatory strategy in its relations with IAEA. In this 
respect, Iran allowed the Agency inspectors to visit and inspect some of its facilities in 
Iran in March and May which it was not obligated to do so under NPT.125 It also 
submitted a report to IAEA declaring for the first time its heavy water production 
facility project at Arak in June 2003.126 In June 2003, IAEA issued two reports stating 
that Iran had failed to fulfill some of its obligations under Safeguards Agreements such 
as “reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of the material and 
the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.”127 The report 
also stated that there had been several findings of highly enriched uranium in 
diversified nuclear sites, which was refused by Iran on the grounds that they might be 
remnants of contaminated material from abroad.128  
                                                 
122  Ibid.  
 
123 International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Text of the Agreement Between Iran and the Agency 
for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons,” IAEA Website, December 13, 1974, accessed April 2, 2011, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf.  
 
124 Mohammad Sahimi, “Iran's Nuclear Program Part III: The Emerging Crisis,” Payvand  Website, 
June 10, 2003, accessed April 5, 2011, http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1039.html.  
 
125  Celalifer-Ekinci, Iran ükleer Krizi, 44. 
   
126  Ibid.  
 
127  Chubin, Iran's uclear Ambitions, xv. 
 
128  Ibid.  
34 
 
 
 In August 2003, Atomic Energy Agency of Iran provided a report to IAEA 
informing the Agency of its “heavy water reactor program, Iran’s use of previously 
imported UO2 in experiments to produce UF4, 'bench scale' conversion experiments 
and Iran’s past interest in laser fusion and spectroscopy.”129 The highly enriched 
uranium found on various nuclear sites and Iran's acceptances of previous uranium 
conversion experiments lead IAEA in September 2003 to urge Iran sign the Additional 
Protocol by October 31.130 On October 9, 2003, Atomic Energy Agency of Iran issued a 
letter to IAEA acknowledging that Iran performed various nuclear related laboratory 
and benchmark experiments between 1981 and 1993.131 
 
  In a November 2003 report, IAEA concluded that Iran had been engaged in 
developing a uranium centrifuge enrichment program for 18 years and a laser 
enrichment program for 12 years.132 In this respect, Iran had acknowledged its failure to 
fully inform IAEA of its nuclear-related activities, including the production, irradiation 
and conversion activities, thereby breaching its obligations under NPT.133 It was also 
stated in the same report that Iran was willing to temporarily suspend all its nuclear 
related activities, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes and not to 
import enrichment related items.134  
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 2.4.3 EU-3 Iranian egotiations on the uclear Issue 
 
 
Following the crisis in 2002, the major powers of the European Union -France, 
Germany and UK- attended the issue with the US backing, which did not have any 
diplomatic relations with Iran since the Revolution.135 Despite differing interests, these 
three major European powers, called EU-3, took a unitary stance towards the Iranian 
nuclear issue. Contrary to the US preference for “hard power” resolution strategies such 
as military intervention and regime change, the EU-3 agreed on pursuing diplomatic 
negotiations with Iran. Since the onset of the crisis in 2002, the EU has been the 
primary actor conducting diplomatic negotiations with Iran for the resolution of the 
nuclear crisis. The primary foreign policy objective for the EU-3 regarding the 
resolution of the issue has been to convince Iran to suspend  its nuclear enrichment 
program. While the EU-3 seemed successful in attaining this objective at the first stages 
of negotiations, this success did not exhibit continuity. As a matter of fact, EU-3's 
success in solving the issue depended very much on the domestic political conjuncture 
in Iran. In this respect, the EU-3 and Iranian diplomatic negotiations displayed 
differential outcomes under the rule of two Iranian presidents, President Mohammad 
Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  
 
 
2.4.3.1 egotiations with the EU-3 under President Khatami     
 
 
The first set of bilateral diplomatic meetings between EU-3 and Iran started in 2003 
under Khatami's presidency. Overall, Iran's relations with the EU-3 over its nuclear 
program under Khatami's presidency reflected elements of pragmatism, moderation and 
conciliation. As the representative of the reformist faction of the Iranian population, 
Khatami sought to pursue a realist and pragmatic rather than a value-driven foreign 
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policy.136 Among his foreign policy objectives was to diminish Iran's isolation, to revive 
the domestic economy through international financial agreements, and to establish more 
dialogue and cooperation with the external world.137 Khatami's approach to the Iranian 
nuclear issue was also pragmatic in that he favored diplomatic negotiations as a key to 
avoid confrontation with the international community and further international 
isolation.  
 
 Up until mid-2003, AEOI was the agency responsible for both the political and 
technical aspects of the nuclear program.138 However, in mid-2003 Iran felt that “the 
gravity of the negotiations required high-level official attention,” thereby leading to the 
meeting of Supreme National Security Council for the first time to discuss the nuclear 
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reform for the internal state policies, their mottoes for foreign policy were “pragmatism and rationalism” 
rather than “tradition and conservatism.” They could attract the attention of the academics, journalists, 
students and of moderate clerics, who advocated Iran's isolation in the international arena. The last 
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crisis.139 After this SNSC meeting, the nuclear decision-making elite decided that one 
person should coordinate all the committees involved in the nuclear issue, who 
happened to be Hassan Rowhani.140  
 
  Rowhani's negotiations with the EU-3 in 2003 ended with the intended results 
on the part of the E3, where Iran seemed to be convinced to temporarily suspend its 
uranium enrichment activities and sign the Additional Protocol under Tehran 
Declaration.141 Iran signed the Additional Protocol of NPT in December 2003, in 
Vienna, thereby acknowledging the IAEA additional inspection authority to inspect 
both declared and possible undeclared activities without prior notification.142 However, 
the signing of the Additional Protocol did not wholly resolve the issue. The situation got 
even more complicated in 2004, when IAEA accused Iran of “reporting failures and 
inconsistencies.”143 As a matter of fact, IAEA found previously unrevealed nuclear 
enrichment designs on certain Iranian facilities in February 2004, which the Agency 
thought to be provided by the Pakistani A.Q. Khan network, and condemned Iran for 
not fully disclosing its nuclear activities.144  
 
 While Iran's initial reaction to the IAEA report included a ban on the entrance of 
IAEA inspectors on Iranian nuclear facilities and the demolishing of the Lavizan 
nuclear site under the inspection of IAEA officials; it still compromised with the IAEA 
on a plan to alleviate the international community's concerns related to the disclosure of 
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all nuclear activities.145 However, when the IAEA head ElBaradei issued a report in 
June 2004, condemning Iran for not fully complying with IAEA inspections, Iran 
declared its intention to resume its nuclear activities temporarily suspended with the 
Tehran Declaration.146 The crisis was resolved in November 2004 with the Paris 
Agreement, signed between Iran and EU-3, according to which Iran reiterated its 
commitment to NPT, promised to voluntarily apply the Additional Protocol of NPT, 
agreed to cooperate with the IAEA on inspections and to suspend all enrichment and 
processing related activities in exchange for certain economic incentives and peaceful 
nuclear energy transfer by the EU.147 Iranian chief negotiator Hassan Rowhani stated 
that Iran had agreed on the Paris Agreement with an attempt “to improve relations with 
the West.”148  
 
 The rapprochement between Iran and EU-3 as created with the Paris Agreement 
was not long-lived, either. The relations got again complicated with another ElBaradei 
report stating that Iran, while complying with IAEA inspections, still withdrew 
information regarding certain nuclear activities.149 Upon this report, EU-3 wanted Iran 
to permanently suspend the nuclear program, which was rejected by Iran on the grounds 
that peaceful nuclear energy is the right of every nation and the permanent suspension 
of the nuclear program would be against the Paris Agreement.150 In a Geneva meeting 
with EU-3 officials in May 2005, Iran ensured the EU-3 to wait until the new European 
proposal due at the end of July 2005, despite its previous intention to resume the 
nuclear enrichment activities.151 Iran kept this promise until July 26, 2005, when Iranian 
President Khatami declared Iran's wish to restart its nuclear activities instead of waiting 
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for the pending EU proposals.152  
 
 The historical account between 2003 and 2005 indicates that Iran, despite ups 
and downs, pursued a peaceful, moderate and conciliatory foreign policy on the nuclear 
issue between 2003 and late 2005. Iran was open to negotiation with the EU-3 until 
Khatami's July 26 declaration, which appeared only six days before the presidential 
elections in Iran. Khatami lost presidency to his rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on 
August 2, 2005, after which the conciliatory tone of Iranian foreign policy on the 
nuclear issue experienced significant transformations. 
 
 
2.4.3.2 egotiations with the EU-3 under President Ahmadinejad 
 
 
Iran's moderate and pragmatic foreign policy approach to the handling of the nuclear 
issue underwent changes in the post-2005 period. This period is identified first by an 
uneasiness on the part of Iran voicing its demands to restart the temporarily suspended 
nuclear program and then by an outright confrontational attitude towards the 
international community when the hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to 
power.  
 
 When the hardliners gained dominance in the Iran’s parliament in 2004, they 
raised their concerns that reformists were risking Iran's national interests by the pursuit 
of such a soft foreign policy strategy with the international community for the 
settlement of the nuclear crisis.153 Then on August 2, 2005, the hardliner candidate 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gained victory in the presidential elections. On August 5, 2005, 
EU offered a package of incentives for Iran to stop its enrichment activities. In 
exchange for Iran's compliance with international nuclear regime, EU-3 offered 
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cooperation in a wide range of issue areas including nuclear energy, transportation, 
communication, investment and trade with Iran; EU support for Iran's membership in 
WTO; and regional cooperation on fight against drug trafficking, nuclear weapons 
trade, terrorism and on the nuclearization of the Middle East.154 Unsatisfied by the 
incentives offered by EU, Ahmadinejad immediately rejected the proposal as 
“ridiculous and disparaging” and “irrevocably” resumed uranium processing activities 
on August 8.155 Although Khatami also wanted to resume the temporarily suspended 
nuclear activities after IAEA inspections, he still showed a willingness to cooperate and 
establish dialogue with the international community. On the other hand, President 
Ahmadinejad displayed a non-cooperative attitude towards the incentive packages by 
EU-3 immediately after he came to power, by declaring that Iran would “irrevocably” 
resume its uranium enrichment activities.  
 
 In February 2006, following the long-time US proposals to refer the Iranian 
nuclear issue to UN, the issue began to be discussed in the Security Council.156 In June 
2006, the High Representative for CFSP and Secretary General Javier Solana of the 
European Union presented a new package of proposals to Iran to re-open negotiations. 
The package included “a promise to support the construction of light water nuclear 
reactors and the sale of commercial planes to Iran, a conference on regional security 
issues, a long-term energy partnership between the EU.”157 However, Iran rejected the 
Solana package and did not suspend the enrichment and the processing activities.  
 
 Ahmadinejad was committed to the revolutionary ideals of protecting the 
country against external enemies and of preserving the country's military self-reliance. 
As Dueck emphasizes, “the international indifference to Saddam’s war crimes and 
Tehran’s lack of an effective response has led Iran’s war veteran President to perceive 
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that the security of his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties.”158 
Ahmadinejad regarded the EU as acting at the command of the United States and 
IAEA, who were, in Ahmadinejad's words, “bullies determined to prevent Iran's 
progress and advancement.”159 As a result, Ahmadinejad breached the Paris Agreement, 
declined EU's new incentive packages offering economic cooperation and security 
guarantees, resumed uranium enrichment activities, and “adopted a more belligerent 
posture towards the EU, the IAEA and the United States.”160 Since Ahmadinejad's 
coming to power in late 2005, Iran has also ignored the international threats to stop the 
enrichment program, either in the form of UN sanctions or U.S. military strikes.161 
 
 
2.4.3.3 Referral of the Issue to the USC and U Sanctions 
 
 
Given Iran's reluctance to permanently suspend its nuclear program despite the 
incentives proposed by EU-3, the USA finally convinced the international community 
to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. UN Security Council passed four rounds 
of sanctions against Iran for not suspending its nuclear activities.  
 
 The first one was passed in December 2006 and required all UN member states 
to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of nuclear-related technology, goods and materials 
to the Iranian territory.162 The second one was passed in March 2007 and sought to 
prevent other states from dealing with several nuclear, chemical and industrial entities 
as well as several individuals and organizations associated with the Revolutionary 
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Guard Corps and Bank Sepah, who were supposed to be actively involved in the 
ballistic missile development program.163 The third round of sanctions, passed in March 
2008, called for a ban on the sale and transfer of nuclear-related items to Iran; a 
withdrawal of financial assistance by companies in other states trading with Iran; 
freezing of financial assets of organizations and individuals associated with the Iranian 
nuclear program; and closer monitoring of the activities of two Iranian banks, Bank 
Melli and Bank Saderat.164 Upon co-decision by European governments, the second and 
third rounds of sanctions were applied in an even expanded manner. Accordingly, the 
second round of sanctions forbade the entrance of Iranian persons to the EU territory, 
who were related either with the sale of nuclear weapons or with Iranian nuclear 
program, and foresaw the freezing of their assets.165 The third round was expanded by 
the EU to include a freezing of bank accounts in various European capitals and the 
introduction of new restrictions on trade.  
 
 In June 2010, UN Security Council passed the fourth round of sanctions against 
Iran. According to this,  
 
 “Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another state 
 involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and 
 technology; all states shall prevent the supply, sale or transfer to Iran any 
 military equipment such as artillery systems, warships or missiles; states shall 
 take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer to Iran of technology or 
 technical assistance related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear 
 weapons; and Iran’s use of the international financial system shall be blocked, 
 particularly its banks when they may be used to fund proliferation and nuclear 
 activities.”166  
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 On July 23, 2010, EU presented an even hardened package of sanctions against 
Iran. The sanctions package targets banking and oil and gas sectors. As far as oil and 
gas sector is concerned, the sanctions prohibit the transfer of any material or technology 
that can be used in refining, exploration and the production of liquefied natural gas.167 
As for the banking sector, there will be a closer control on Iran-connected banks 
operating in the EU and bank transfers to and from Iran, including freeze of previously 
unsanctioned Iranian banks.168  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
  
 
This chapter has provided a historical background of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime and of the Iranian nuclear program. An historical overview of the Iranian 
nuclear program shows that Iran was one of the main benefactors of US nuclear 
technology transfer during the Shah period. However, the worsening of bilateral 
relations following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent Hostage Crisis 
ended the American nuclear technology transfer to Iran. While the Iranian nuclear 
program came to a halt during Ayatollah Khomeini era, the destructive experience of 
Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 reintroduced the need for military self-reliance.  As a result, 
the nuclear program was restarted during Ayatollah Khamenei era.  
 
 Following the 2002 nuclear crisis, the EU-3 initiated diplomatic negotiations 
with Iran for the resolution of the issue. These negotiations included several incentive 
packages offered to Iran in exchange for its abortion of the nuclear program. The two 
presidential periods in Iran exhibited different reactions to EU incentives. While the 
Khatami government seemed more willing to cooperate with the EU, the Ahmadinejad 
government pursued a more outright foreign policy towards the EU. As a result, Iran 
faced several rounds of UN sanctions as well as unilateral sanctions imposed by the EU.   
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
THEORIES OF UCLEAR PROLIFERATIO 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter will provide the theoretical background for the analysis of the Iranian 
nuclear issue. The first section will be devoted to an exploration of the major theories of 
nuclear proliferation. In this respect, a theoretical foundations of neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, constructivism, and domestic politics will be discussed. Afterwords, 
the contribution and limitations of these theories in explaining the Iranian nuclear issue 
will be discussed. Finally, power transition will be presented as an alternative theory to 
explain the Iranian rationale for the nuclear program as well as the international 
community's pressure on Iran.  
 
 
3.2 An Overview of Theoretical Perspectives on uclear Proliferation  
 
 
 3.2.1 eorealism 
 
 
Realist theories focus on the international security environment in explaining the 
motivations of states' actions. Waltzian neorealism assumes that states exist in an 
anarchic international environment. In the absence of a central authority setting certain 
rules, norms and institutions for international interactions, individual states rely on self-
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help measures to ensure their own survival. As a systemic theory, Waltzian neorealism 
sees the distribution of power in an anarchic international setting as the main source of 
states' foreign policy choices. Therefore, it assumes states to be unitary actors, or black 
boxes, where domestic political concerns do not matter in decision-making. The 
distribution of power provides information to the states within the system, with which 
the states enter into a cost-benefit analysis to determine the most profitable course of 
action for them. In that sense, neorealism is a rationalistic theory, which emphasizes the 
role of external security calculations in states' foreign policy decisions.169     
 
 According to the realist theory, the external security environment of a state may 
provide powerful incentives to states for acquiring nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons 
can be developed as deterrents against overwhelming conventional military threats.170 
One common explanation for nuclear weapons proliferation is that states may acquire 
nuclear weapons as a response to emerging nuclear threats.171 Scholars such as Waltz, 
Gaddis and Morgan argue that nuclear weapons have much deterrent capability due to 
their immense destructive capability.172 Waltz argues that “nuclear weapons dissuade 
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states more surely than conventional weapons do” due to their mutual destruction 
capability and their domination of war strategies.173 Similarly, in explaining why great 
superpowers were relatively cautious in risking war with one another despite many 
crises, Gaddis argues that the existence of nuclear weapons as well as “the direct 
evidence of what they can do when used against human beings has given this 
generation a painfully vivid awareness of the realities of war that no previous 
generation has had.”174 Nuclear programs are steps toward acquiring nuclear weapons 
capability. Accordingly, realist theories would argue that Iran would want to continue its 
nuclear program to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons in order to secure 
itself.175 
 
 The realist accounts of US concerns with Iran's nuclear program center around 
the implications of the program for the security and stability in the Middle East. First of 
all, the USA sees the prevention of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons 
crucial for the prevention of an arms race in the region.176 A nuclear Iran is expected to 
cause the nuclearization of other Middle Eastern countries, most notably Turkey, Egypt 
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and Saudi Arabia.177 Secondly, in the post-9/11 security environment, the USA fears 
that nuclear weapons can be transferred to terrorist organizations in the Middle East. In 
that context, the USA has declared Iran to be the sponsor of terrorism due to its support 
for Hamas and Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon against Israel.178 Thirdly, the USA fears 
that a nuclear Iran would threaten the Israeli existence and military supremacy in the 
region.179 Israel is the only nuclear power in the region. A nuclear Iran would not only 
give rise to further military build-up on both sides, but it would also cause problems 
with bilateral deterrence between Iran and Israel in a multipolar environment where 
other states also go nuclear.180 
 
 From a neorealist perspective, Iran's nuclear ambitions could be explained with 
reference to two security related issues. First, Iran's another perceived security threat is 
from the USA. The American invasion of Afghanistan and its overthrowing of the 
Taliban regime in 2001 and the deployment of troops in Iraq coupled by the fall of the 
Saddam regime in 2003 led to the weakening of Iran's two rivals in the region.181 
However, now surrounded by the American military presence on its west and east, Iran 
fears from a US invasion or attack on the Iranian territory.182 Iran's relations with the 
USA have been cold since the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Islamic Revolution in 
1979.183 In the post-9/11 period, the USA is concerned with Iran's change of regional 
balance through its nuclear weapons program.184 On the other hand, Iran's perceived 
security threats are further fueled every time a U.S. official talks about the “axis of 
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evil,” “regime change,” or “pre-emptive strike.”185 From a realist perspective, one 
reason that could make Iran consider obtaining nuclear weapons is changing the 
balance of power to Iran's advantage, thereby preventing others states such as the US 
from occupying and controlling their state.186 
 
 Secondly, the existence of new nuclear states in the vicinity of Iran such as 
Pakistan, Israel and India leads Iran to follow a new security policy based on self-
sufficiency and deterrence.187 The Pakistani case poses an indirect security threat to 
Iran. In the post-9/11 period, threat perceptions of the international community have 
come to emanate not only from states but also from non-state actors including terrorist 
groups. The sale of or the theft of nuclear material by terrorist groups from nuclear 
states has become a primary security issue.188 Although Pakistan has been feared to 
engage in the sale of nuclear material to terrorist groups, it has not been placed on the 
list of countries supporting a leading terrorist organization, Taliban.189 The fact that 
USA has not taken any action towards Pakistan's nuclear program has led Iran to 
believe that the USA will not attack a country possessing nuclear capability.190 Israel, 
on the other hand, poses a more direct threat to Iran's existence and security.191 Israel is 
the sole nuclear power holder in the Middle East and it is also not party to NPT. All 
these security threats are further exacerbated by Iran's perceived weakness in 
conventional weapons. Having a nuclear threat in its neighborhood, Iran seems to 
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concentrate on its nuclear program for the purposes of deterrence.192 From a realist 
perspective, Iran sees its nuclear weapons as a substitute for its weak conventional arms 
infrastructure, thereby serving as an “insurance policy” towards any nuclear threats in 
the region.193  
 
 Although realist paradigm provides us with an understanding of Iranian security 
threats and their implications for the nuclear program, it fails to account for many 
dilemmas. First of all, Israel and USA poses only a vague threat for Iran due to the 
absence of any deep historical or existential enemy in its imminent neighborhood, 
contrary to the Pakistani and Indian case.194 It could be argued that Iran has “no urgent 
strategic rationale, due to the lack of any existential threats or imminent enemies.”195 
Secondly, Iran’s major regional challenger, Iraq, had already been neutralized in 2003, 
which leaves Iran with no urgent need for nuclear weapons. Thirdly, Iran's insistence on 
its nuclear program also increases Israel's perception of security threats and its military 
build-up, thereby creating a security dilemma for itself. The security dilemma may be 
further fueled by the nuclearization of other states in the region.  
 
 
 3.2.2 eoliberal Institutionalism 
 
 
The second school of thought explaining the Iranian nuclear issue is neoliberal 
institutionalism, which is a rationalistic theory of international cooperation. It adopts a 
rationalistic position in explaining the dynamics behind the establishment of 
international regimes and international organizations.196 It follows the same neorealist 
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assumptions that international system is marked by anarchy, in which unitary and 
rational states engage in a cost-benefit analysis in order maintain their interests. The 
common point between realism and neoliberal institutionalism is that they have much 
explanatory power in explaining the conflict among self-seeking states that derive from 
a clash of interests. However, what is missing in such an inference is that there might 
not only be a clash of interest but also a convergence of interest among these self-
seeking and rational actors, as a result of which cooperation may occur. Both realism 
and neoliberal institutionalism recognize there is room for cooperation in an anarchic 
international order. Although both theories acknowledge that states may benefit from 
cooperation on certain occasions, they diverge on the nature of those benefits. 
Neorealism argues that states calculate their relative gains before entering into 
cooperation, whereas neoliberal institutionalism suggests that there is much more room 
for cooperation as states seek absolute gains.197 In that sense, it can be argued that 
neoliberal institutionalism is more optimistic than realism on international 
cooperation.198  
 
 One central notion of neoliberal institutionalism is transaction costs.199 
According to North, transaction costs include “the costliness of information, the costs 
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of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of 
protecting the rights and policing and enforcing agreements.”200 The international 
institutions can reduce transaction costs by providing information to the system on 
“rule-making, negotiating, implementing, enforcing.”201 Therefore, the presence of 
international institutions brings greater opportunities for the states to cooperate with one 
another. Still, following the rationalistic assumption of neoliberal institutionalism, 
Keohane admits that if there were no mutual benefits for parties to gain from an 
agreement, there would be no need for international institutions.202 Keohane argues that 
“institutions should persist as long as, but only so long as their members have 
incentives to maintain them.”203 It follows from the neoliberal institutionalist logic that 
institutions may cease to exist when states no longer see any individual benefits from 
that cooperation. For instance, Keohane recognizes that relative power positions of the 
members are also reflected to the institutions; and as a result, disadvantaged 
governments seeing benefit in an agreement outside the established institution may opt 
out.204 This explains why states may breach their commitments to the regimes.205     
 
 From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the NPT can be argued to be the 
result of a rational interest calculation by individual states who opt for a collective 
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compromise on not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for security. However, such 
a compromise will prevail so long as it serves the interests of all. The flaws of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime deserve scholarly attention at this point. Scholars 
such as Jean du Preez and George Bunn discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
non-proliferation regime in addressing international security issues in the post-9/11 
era.206 The recent Pakistani and Indian nuclear proliferation despite the regime, the 
North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, the heightened role of non-state actors such as 
Pakistani A.Q. Khan Network in nuclear build-up and nuclear trade, the fear of nuclear 
knowledge and technology transfer to terrorist organizations and Iran's insistence on its 
nuclear program despite its membership to the Treaty are some of the issues that can be 
addressed by the neoliberal institutionalist theory.    
 
While the USA has never fully dropped the unilateral military strike option 
against Iran from its agenda, it has also acted in coordination with international 
institutions in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. The USA has closely observed 
the IAEA negotiations with Iran. Furthermore, it has also backed the EU-3 initiatives to 
persuade Iran sign the Additional Protocol and cooperate with IAEA on inspections in 
return for certain security and economic incentives. From a neoliberal institutionalist 
perspective, the US decision to stress the importance of the NPT regime and to support 
any multilateral initiative to solve the issue in coordination with international 
institutions can be explained by certain US interests which are hardly any different from 
the ones set forth by the realist accounts. The possibility that a nuclear Iran might cause 
a nuclear arms race in the region may present a strong incentive for the US to ensure 
Iran's compliance with the NPT regime. The fear that Iran might provide nuclear 
weapons to terrorist organizations in the region might be regarded as another incentive 
for the USA to persuade Iran to comply with the NPT regime. Moreover, the US 
emphasis on the NPT regime may be explained by the fact that USA has taken a more 
cautious approach towards the unilateral military strike option after it has experienced 
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its costs during the Iraqi War.207 In either case, neoliberal institutionalism suggests that 
the US emphasis on the NPT regime can be explained by the benefits the US will get 
from Iran's full compliance with the regime.   
 
Iran has been a party to NPT and has signed the comprehensive safeguards 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Neoliberal institutionalism 
would expect Iran to comply with the regime as long as it gains certain security benefits 
from it. However, Iran has raised its concerns about the selective application of the 
regime by the international community. First of all, Iran sees the exclusive right of five 
nations to retain their nuclear capabilities as specified by the NPT as hypocrisy.208 
Secondly, there are two nuclear states, Pakistan, and Israel in its close vicinity, who are 
not party to the NPT. Still, these countries' nuclear programs have not been challenged 
by great nuclear powers as has been the case with Iran's nuclear program. Iranian 
officials have declared that “the exclusive right of five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council to retain nuclear weapons with the toleration of Israel makes non-
proliferation a truly futile expectation.”209 From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, 
Iran's breach of IAEA safeguards can be explained with the relative cost of compliance 
in the face of an Israeli and Pakistani nuclear threat in the region. Israel's non-
cooperation, in terms of its refusal to be subject to the NPT regime and IAEA 
inspections, also increases Iran's costs for complying with the regime. As a result, NPT 
regime is not an adequate incentive for Iran to stop its nuclear program.210  
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 3.2.3 Constructivism 
 
 
Besides these rationalistic theories, some scholars emphasize the role of meaning 
structures, ideas, identities and norms in shaping states' behavior. Constructivism is a 
school of thought which argues that “the world is constituted socially through 
intersubjective interaction,” where agents and structures mutually constitute one 
another.211 Constructivist approach suggests that it is non-material and ideational factors 
are what shape states' practices.212 The constructivist literature in International 
Relations has been adopted to explain the establishment of international institutions and 
to understand international security.213 Two most common non-material factors 
discussed by constructivist scholars are identities or our perception about ourselves, and 
norms.214 The foreign policy discourse of a state, which is a set of statements about the 
state's identity and its perception of “legitimate code of conduct,” shapes the state's 
foreign policy behavior, preferences and interests.215 Systemic constructivists such as 
Wendt argue that the meaning structures at the international level shape foreign policy 
behavior.216 Still, Wendt does not wholly dismiss the importance of unit-level 
discourses and states' role, although limited when compared to systems-level norms, in 
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determining states' behavior.217 Constructivist scholars like Onuf define domestic 
discourses as central to states' foreign policy making.218   
 
 Constructivist literature on nuclear non-proliferation argues that nuclear norms 
and symbols can lead both to nuclearization and denuclearization. Sagan argues that the 
question of nuclearization and denuclearization is also determined by deeper norms and 
shared beliefs about the legitimacy and appropriateness of nuclear weapons.219 A 
constructivist approach to the NPT regime would discuss the establishment and 
observation of the regime with reference to the existence of non-proliferation norms at 
the international level. For instance, Tannenwald adopts the international “nuclear 
taboo” notion to explain why not so many states have gone nuclear so far.220 However, 
there are also norms that encourage acquisition of nuclear weapons. Some scholars 
focus on nuclear weapons as symbols of technological development, prestige and 
modernity.221 O'Neill argues that nuclear weapons may symbolize technical prowess, 
modernity or as full recognition as a member of the world system.222 Although literature 
on prestige as a motive for nuclear weapons acquisition is sparse, individual case 
studies on several states such as France, China and Australia indicate that these 
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countries sought prestige through nuclear weapons.223   
 
 The constructivist literature would be expected to treat the US emphasis on the 
Iranian nuclear issue with reference to the existence of international non-proliferation 
norms, notably the NPT regime. In this respect, the USA might insist on Iran to suspend 
its nuclear program, as any state's defection from the NPT regime would be a blow to 
the regime's credibility. On the Iranian side, the constructivist literature on Iranian 
nuclear program argues that the nuclear program has certain symbolic meanings for 
Iran. For Iran, the nuclear program is compatible with Iranian Revolutionary discourses 
such as “independence” and “justice.”224 Both discourses are intimately related to the 
“historical victimization,” where the “Iranian glorious past” has been disturbed by 
“(semi)-colonial” invaders such as the USA, UK and Russia.225 While this has led to a 
feeling of underdevelopment and dependence on the outside world, the Islamic 
Revolution has promoted the ideals of independence, equality and self-reliance. The 
nuclear weapons symbolize these very Revolutionary ideals of prestige, independence, 
equality and self-reliance.226 Besides being the symbol of Revolutionary ideals, nuclear 
weapons also symbolize development, scientific and technological advancement and 
modernization.227 Apart from this scholarly work on nuclear symbols as the drivers of 
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Iranian nuclearization, some scholars focus on the Iranian strategic personality, which 
shape its relations with the international community on the nuclear issue. Ziemke 
argues that “all nations are the product of a historical experience, [which] provides the 
blueprint for its strategic personality: how it sees its relationship to the outside world, 
assesses its options and national interests, and makes decisions about how to act.’’228 
Relying on Shiite Islam and the Iranian Revolution in her analysis, Ziemke defines 
Iranian strategic personality as “introverted, intuitive, feeling,” which creates tensions 
with the American “extroverted” strategic personality in the resolution of deterrence 
issues.229   
 
 While constructivist accounts provide us with valuable insight on the role of 
nuclear norms and institutions as possible dynamics behind Iran's nuclear program and 
the specific US emphasis on Iran, they fail on many occasions. First of all, the argument 
that the US concern on Iran stems from its generic emphasis on the continuation of the 
NPT regime does not hold viable. For one thing, the USA was the main technological, 
scientific and financial supporter of the nuclear program during the Shah regime. For 
another, Iran is not the only country with a nuclear program. As a matter of fact, several 
non-NPT states such as India and Pakistan have performed nuclear tests and Israel has 
developed nuclear weapons. Similarly, North-Korea has withdrawn from the NPT 
regime and declared itself to be nuclear state. However, the USA has not responded to 
the Israeli, Indian and Pakistani proliferation with multilateral sanctions as tough as 
those of Iran. Although there is no conclusive evidence that Iran's nuclear program is 
aimed at nuclear weaponization, the US backed international community has imposed 
four rounds of sanctions on Iran. The selective application of the NPT regime on Iran 
by the USA suggests that it is not driven by international non-proliferation norms in the 
Iranian case. Secondly, while nuclear symbols may have a place in the Iranian nuclear 
program, as Sagan argues, symbols and ideas do not have power on their own but are 
reshaped and manipulated in the hands of certain groups who would have a stake in 
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them.230       
 
 
 3.2.4 Domestic Politics 
 
 
 A group of scholars have sought to explain nuclearization with reference to 
domestic politics. One prominent scholar is Scott Sagan, who highlights the role of 
domestic players on nuclearization, either supporting or hindering the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. Sagan suggests that whether acquisition of nuclear weapons may 
serve national interests or not, it may serve the parochial interests or personal interests 
of certain players.231 A state's nuclear energy establishment, the military establishment, 
and politicians in states whose political parties and public's support nuclear acquisition 
can lead the state towards nuclearization.232 These actors are not the passive recipients 
of top-down decisions, but they all engage in a governmental political game where they 
try to persuade one another in the need for acquiring nuclear weapons. When the groups 
favoring nuclear proliferation form a strong coalition thereby surpassing the influence 
of other players in the game, nuclear proliferation option may become the governmental 
decision-making resultant.  
 
Similarly Graham Allison refers to sub-national foreign policy formation in 
explaining nuclearization with his “bureaucratic politics” model, which he introduced in 
his 1969 book Essence of Decision.233 In Allison's bureaucratic politics model, “each 
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national government is a complex arena for intra-national game,” where “the decision-
maker of national policy is not one calculating individual but rather a conglomerate of 
large organizations and political actors.”234  According to the model, the governmental 
actor is not a unitary agent but rather a number of individual players occupying a 
certain position, which define the players' preferences, interests, capabilities and 
responsibilities. Therefore, only national security interests, but also domestic political 
interests and organizational interests play an important role in making decisions on 
foreign policy issues.235 What determines each player's impact on results is “power,” 
which Allison operationalizes as “a blend of bargaining advantages, skills and will in 
using these bargaining advantages and other players' perception of them.”236 The 
decisions and actions of governments are “intra-national political resultants,” meaning 
the decision is “not a solution to a problem chosen among other options,” but rather a 
result of the compromise, conflict and confusion of officials with diverse interests and 
unequal influence.237  
 
 Although there are ample amount of work discussing the role of central 
decision-makers and the domestic political factions on Iranian nuclear decision-making, 
they do not engage much into a thorough theoretical discussion. A good application of 
the domestic politics literature on Iranian nuclear program, on the other hand, is 
advanced by Etel Solingen, who argues that leaders and ruling coalitions' response to 
“internationalization” is the main reason for the states' differing nuclear behavior.238 
Leaders and ruling coalitions favoring internationalization have greater incentives to 
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“avoid the political, economic, reputational and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear 
weapons, because costs impair their domestic agenda.”239 Solingen argues that Iran is an 
inward-oriented country ruled by domestic groups, who derive certain material interests 
from the country's economic self-sufficiency, nationalist values, and Islamic regime.240 
Due to the negative implications of an open-economy to the economic standing of these 
domestic groups within the regime, these groups do not favor internationalization.241 
Due to the political elites' reluctance to be integrated into an open economy, the nuclear 
program does not lead to any economic costs. Moreover, the nuclear program 
contributes to the self-sufficiency of the Iranian regime. Other scholarly work on the 
implications of  domestic politics on Iran's nuclear program do concentrate on the role 
of the Supreme Leader, the presidents, the nuclear scientists within the regime and the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.242  
 
 Domestic politics literature provides a powerful explanation for the Iranian 
nuclear program. However, it suffers from the major weakness that Iran has started its 
nuclear program during the Shah period and has since been insistent on its nuclear 
program regardless of the domestic groups approach to internationalization. Even 
during a reformist president's leadership like Khatami, Iran reiterated its commitment to 
its peaceful nuclear program on many occasions. Neither the overthrowing of Shah and 
the transition to an Islamic regime, nor the power balances among the reformist and 
hardliner camps at the domestic level has led to any changes in Iran's final decision to 
pursue its peaceful nuclear program. The shift in power balances at the domestic level 
only affected Iran's relations with the international community on the resolution of the 
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nuclear issue, but not the nuclear program itself.  
 
 
3.3 An Alternative Theoretical Perspective: Power Transition Theory 
 
 
 3.3.1 The Foundations of the Power Transition Theory 
 
 
While the last grand debate in international relations scholarship concentrated on the 
war between realism and liberalism, the realist paradigm did not go without internal 
schisms.243 Structural realism, which has long dominated the realist paradigm, has been 
challenged first by neoclassical realism, which recognized the actions of states with 
reference to systemic variables and domestic variables at the same time. Zakaria and 
Snyder assume that the state institutions', leaders', and political elites' ability to extract 
domestic resources and mobilize public support affect their international political 
outcomes.244 Another internal schism manifested itself as the division between 
“offensive” and “defensive” realism, which diverged from each other on the question of 
states' intentions. While the former argues that the primary intent of states in 
international relations is to seek power maximization, the latter refutes this proposition 
and argue that the balance of power among states may favor the defender to simply 
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protect its security.245  
 
 Despite such subtleties, all these realist variants share certain assumptions and 
propositions. They all assume that states are the main actors of international relations, 
which rationally seek to preserve or maximize their security interests in an international 
domain marked by anarchy.246 Moreover, they all propose that international conflict and 
cooperation is shaped by the distribution of power and that “high concentration of 
power in the system are destabilizing in the sense that they generally give rise to 
blocking coalitions and often lead to war,” thereby hindering the rise of an hegemon at 
the same time.247 Therefore, all these realist variants are “balance of power theories,” 
although they all diverge from each other on the specifics of who balances and under 
what conditions.248  
 
 The Power transition theory marks a second division within the realist paradigm. 
Introduced by A.F.K Organski in his seminal work World Politics (1958) and further 
developed by Organski and Kugler (1980), Kugler and Lemke (1996), Tammen (2000) 
and Lemke (2002), the power transition theory challenges the core assumptions and 
propositions of the balance of power theories. The power transition theory diverges 
from the balance of power theory on three main assumptions. First of all, power 
transition theory assumes that international domain is not marked by anarchy but 
hierarchy. Second, power transition theory refuses neorealist assumption that bipolarity 
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achieved through power parity between two great powers leads to peace; and instead 
argues that power parity leads to conflict. Third, power transition theory challenges the 
static view of nations' power. 
 
 In his initial formulation of the theory, Organski depicted the international 
system not as anarchy but as hierarchy. Organski delineated this hierarchy like a 
pyramid, where a dominant power sits at the top, great powers are situated in the middle 
and less powerful states are scattered at the lower ends. Although there is an absence of 
central authority in the international arena, there are “established patterns or 
international orders” that shape states' interactions249 The privilege for setting the rules 
of international interaction is in the hands of the dominant power in the system. The 
totality of these specific patterns of interaction employed internationally in economic, 
political and military terms is called status-quo by Organski.250 The dominant state sets 
the status-quo by an international projection of its way of extracting political and 
economic resources domestically to the international arena.251 Lemke argues that such a 
projection has both material and immaterial benefits to the dominant power. On 
material terms, the established patterns bringing political and economic benefits 
domestically can also reap benefits for the dominant power if employed 
internationally.252 On immaterial terms, the established patterns which have proved 
successful domestically can legitimize the dominant power's leadership 
internationally.253 In either case, the dominant power has the incentive to preserve and 
reinforce the international status-quo in political, economic and military terms.  
 
 However, not all states benefit from the status-quo set by the dominant power. 
The degree of reaping benefits from the international status-quo is not the same among 
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the dominant power, great powers and small powers. Organski and Kugler argue that 
certain great powers may become dissatisfied with the status-quo, as the status-quo has 
been established without them having a say to it and the resources have already been 
allocated.254 In cases where rising nation is denied certain benefits that are already 
shared by the dominant power and its great power allies at the time of the status-quo 
construction, that nation may become dissatisfied and challenge the status-quo.255 The 
rising power may act like a parvenu, who thinks that if it has already risen to power in 
the existing unfavorable status-quo, it would have risen even much under a status-quo 
from which it would reap greater benefit.256  
 
 Contrary to the neorealist theory, power transition theory expects a conflict 
between the dominant power and the rising dissatisfied power when they achieve power 
parity. The conflict is expected to be more probable and intense when parity 
approaches257 However, the theory suggests that neither the power parity nor 
dissatisfaction can alone lead to conflict. The power transition theory argues that a 
power parity between great powers that are benefiting from the international status-quo 
and are satisfied with it do not challenge the dominant power.258 The likelihood of war 
increases only when there is a congruence of parity between a dominant power and a 
dissatisfied challenger. The empirical findings of many power transitions scholars prove 
the hypothesis that a congruence of power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo 
leads to war, while a near or full power parity between a dominant power and a satisfied 
great power may lead to integration.259 
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 3.3.2 The Measurement of Key Variables 
 
 
The measurement of the power, hierarchy, status-quo and dissatisfaction has been a 
theoretical concern for the power transition scholars since the introduction of the theory. 
The discussion on the measurement of power precedes another central question raised 
by power transition scholars as to source of national power. In his 1958 work, Organski 
criticizes the balance of power theories for treating the national power as static.260 On 
the contrary, by looking at the power shift among dominant and rising countries in the 
18th and 19th century Europe, he concludes that a nation's power comes from within, 
from their levels of industrialization.261 As a result, as opposed to what balance of 
power theories suggest, “The relative powers of countries can change independently of 
other countries, as those with the faster rates of growth catch up and overtake those that 
grow slowly.262 Subsequent work on power transition theory reiterated the assumption 
that internal development and growth is the main reason for the differentiation of power 
between the dominant power and the challenger; and therefore, a differentiation in the 
internal growth rate of nations is the main dynamic behind all international 
interactions.263  
 
 Initially, Organski proposed six criteria to measure a a nation's power, which are 
economic development, demography, national morale, resources, geography and the 
efficacy of political structure.264 Organski dropped the national morale, resources and 
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geography variables and concentrated on population size, economic development and 
the efficacy of political structure for the ease of measurement.265 In their 1980 work, 
Organski and Kugler embrace GNP as the main instrument to measure economic 
development and population size as the main sources of national power.266 Later de 
Soysa, Oneal and Park replicated Houweling and Siccama's analysis with the Correlates 
of War (COW) composite index and GDP in their 1997 work.267 The Correlates of War 
composite index includes demographic, military and industrial components of national 
development, thereby adding the military power variable to their analysis. Efird et. al. 
defines hierarchy or the relative power among nations as “the objective ability of one 
nation to impose its preferences on the opponent by persuasion if possible and by force 
if necessary.”268 Organski and Kugler treat the rising challengers that are within the 20 
% of the dominant nation's as having the potential to acquire power parity.269  
 
 In their 2000 work, Tammen et. al. place the United States at the top of the 
international hierarchy as the dominant power.270 The current great powers are China, 
Japan, a Germany dominated EU, and Russia.271 France, Brazil and Italy are labeled as 
the middle powers.272 Given the existence of the USA as the dominant power in the 
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international arena, it projects its domestic way of extracting resources to the 
international system as the status-quo. In this respect, the political, economical and 
ideological projection of US defined status-quo is visible in its promotion of 
democracy, human rights, open liberal economy and international institutions to the 
international system.273 The main concern for USA is to preserve and further promote 
this international status-quo. The IMF and WTO regimes as the promoters of a 
worldwide open liberal economy, the US attempts for regime change in different parts 
of the world, the defensive military organizations such as NATO, and the multiplicity of 
democratic international institutions establishing certain diplomacy as the norm for 
interaction among states can all be regarded as the components of the status-quo set by 
the USA. Great powers that benefit from this status-quo are satisfied with it; and 
therefore, even if they have the potential to achieve power parity with the dominant 
power, they do not challenge it. On the contrary, they become fully integrated into the 
status-quo to further benefit from it. Although power transition theory has initially been 
introduced to predict future war by revealing patterns of international conflict, some 
power transition scholars have also embraced the theory to explain regional cooperation 
and integration. Efird, Kugler and Genna analyze the Germany-UK cooperation in the 
post-World War II period with power transition theory.274  
 
 There is little academic compromise on the measurement of dissatisfaction 
among power transition theory scholars. The two most commonly employed 
measurement for dissatisfaction are “the similarity of alliance portfolios” and “the 
similarity of domestic systems.” Introduced by Bueno de Mesquita, the similarity of 
alliance portfolios argument suggests that dyads with similar alliance portfolios are 
more satisfied and less likely to fight with one another, while dyads with dissimilar 
alliance portfolios are more likely to wage war when they achieve power parity.275 On 
                                                 
273 Lemke, “The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 
24. 
 
274 See Brian Efird, Jacek Kugler and Gespare Genna, “From War to Integration: Generalizing the 
Dynamic of Power Transition,” 310-312.  
 
275 For a list of literature employing the similarity of alliance portfolios as the measurement of 
status-quo satisfaction, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of 
War,” International Studies Quarterly 25:4 (1981): 541–568; James D. Morrow, “On The Theoretical 
68 
 
the other hand, scholars such as Lemke concentrate on the similarity of economic and 
political systems employed domestically and suggest that states with dissimilar political 
and economic systems to the ones employed by the dominant power are more likely to 
challenge it when they achieve power parity.276 Apart from these two arguments, 
Werner and Kugler propose extraordinary military build-up as an indicator of 
challenger's dissatisfaction with the status-quo.277 Tammen and Kugler adopt a broader 
set of variables to measure the Chinese dissatisfaction with the international status-quo 
set by the US. Their dissatisfaction indicators include the existence of a territorial 
dispute, arms build-up directed against each other, compliance with the international 
rules, participation in the political and economic blocs, ideological disputes and the 
absence of binding patterns of trade and cooperation between states.278   
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 3.3.3 The Application of the Model to Regional Power Transitions 
 
 
While power transition theory has been adopted by many scholars to explain global 
power shifts, there has also been an attempt to adapt the theory to power transitions at 
the regional and local level. Lemke's “multiple hierarchy model” suggests that 
international system is composed of parallel hierarchies functioning similarly at the 
regional level.279 In the multiple hierarchy model, Lemke puts smaller pyramids 
depicting regional hierarchies within the international pyramid introduced by Organski. 
The “sub-hierarchies” within the overall international system display similar 
characteristics to those of the global hierarchy.280 There is a local dominant state that 
sits above smaller powers in the region. Like the global dominant power, the local 
dominant sets the local status-quo in the system. When one of the local great powers 
dissatisfied with the local status-quo achieves parity with the local dominant power, the 
probability of war is high.281 As the local challengers cannot exert any significant 
military and political influence at the global level, they seek to become influential at the 
regional level.282 Lemke has applied his theory to African regional hierarchies to 
explain the sources of local conflict in the region. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has focused on a theoretical discussion of the major international relations 
theories on nuclear proliferation. The theoretical discussion has shown that while 
neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, and domestic politics have 
contributed to understanding the various aspects of the Iranian nuclear issue, they also 
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exhibited several weaknesses. In this respect, the power transition theory has been 
presented as an alternative approach.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
A AALYSIS OF THE IRAIA UCLEAR PROGRAM  
FROM A POWER TRASITIO PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
This thesis will focus on the application of power transition theory to the Iranian case. 
An overview of the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 relations among relevant countries involved 
in the region is necessary to see the shifts in regional balances. The analysis of this shift 
will be supported by quantitative data on the indicators of national power. Following 
this background information, the chapter will discuss the characteristics of the US led 
status-quo and the Iranian stance towards this status-quo. The chapter will end with an 
analysis of the current and future possible policy options for both parties in the 
resolution of nuclear crisis. 
 
 
4.2 Regional Balances in the Pre-9/11 Period 
 
 
An analysis of the change in regional balances in the post-9/11 Middle East requires an 
overview of the Middle East in the pre-9/11 period. During the Cold War, the Middle 
East was the zone of superpower rivalry, who sought to contain each other's expansion 
in the region. The US presence in the region goes back to 1950s, when its primary 
interest was the protection of Gulf oil against Soviet expansion. The protection of oil 
against the Soviet Union was important for “the US global hegemony,” due to its 
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implications for the maintenance of the US military power and for the workings of its 
chief industries in a worldwide capitalist economy.283 However, the US control in the 
region was not only limited to preventing the Soviet expansion, but it was also extended 
to prevent the rise of any regional power as the regional hegemon. Because, the rise of 
any Middle Eastern state as the regional hegemon would also increase the stakes of that 
state to have an extended control by this state on the Gulf oil.284 As a result, the US 
policy towards the Middle East manifested the characteristics of a hegemonic 
relationship in the region.285 While it established a clientalistic and dependent 
relationship with the small, oil-rich Gulf States, it sought to prevent the rise of any 
potential regional power to ensure its own control over oil.286       
 
 One Middle Eastern country with which the USA established good relations 
during Cold War was Saudi Arabia. The rich oil reserves made this country important 
on the US security agenda. As a result, the USA extended its security guarantees to 
Saudi Arabia against a possible Soviet seizure of Saudi oil fields.287 While the rich oil 
reserves seemed to increase the strategic importance of this country, “it did not translate 
into Arab power.”288 Because, the petrodollars were “recycled,” meaning they were 
again channeled to the West through Arab investment in Western real estates, banks and 
imports.289 Fearing that the establishment of a citizens' army could lead to a “nationalist 
coup,” Saudi Arabia chose to spend much on American arms instead, thereby feeding its 
strategic weakness.290 Such an increased dependence on the USA hindered the possible 
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rise of this oil-rich country as a potential regional hegemon in the long run.291  
 
 Another country that the USA had friendly relations in the region was Iran. 
While the US was in cooperation with Iran under pro-American Shah's rule in a wide 
range of areas including military, technological and nuclear energy support, the bilateral 
security relationship intensified with the UK's withdrawal from Suez in 1971, leaving a 
security vacuum to be filled by the US.292 During Shah's rule, Iran had overall friendly 
relations with other countries in the region as well. It had good relations with Pakistan 
and Turkey on the Northern Tier, with pro-Western Gulf States of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, and moderate regional powers such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Israel.293 Moreover, it was a member of Western-led regional formal alliances, such as 
the Baghdad Pact. In short, the two biggest American allies in the region against Soviet 
expansion happened to be Saudi Arabia and Iran.     
 
 While the alliance with Saudi Arabia has been prolonged to this date, the 
favorable relations between the USA and Iran were not long-lived. The overthrowing of 
pro-American Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and 
the following Iranian Hostage Crisis led to the break-up of friendly relations between 
Iran and the USA.294 Iran replaced its pro-American international stance with a more 
self-dependent, isolationist and nationalistic foreign policy. The Iranian foreign policy 
under Ayatollah Khomeini can be summarized under two pillars, which are “pan-
Islamism” and “neither East nor the West” policy.295 Under the first pillar, Iran sought 
to undermine Americanism adopted by close US allies in the region such as Kuwait, 
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Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt and to export its Islamist regime.296  
Moreover, Iran also started to extend its financial, ideological and military assistance to 
certain Shiite movements in the region, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad.297 This policy ended up with a worsening of relations with these 
countries, exacerbating Iran's isolation in the region. The “neither East nor West” policy 
meant the Iranian attempts to become an independent regional power, looking for the 
support of neither Western powers such as the USA nor the Eastern powers such as the 
Soviet Union.298 As such, the post-revolutionary Iran's challenge was not limited to the 
US interests in the Middle East only. Iran also challenged the Soviet policy under 
bipolar Cold War politics, by supporting anti-communist movements in Afghanistan.299  
 
 Given the Iranian policy change, the USA adopted another policy of 
containment in the region, this time against the export of the Islamist regime. In the 
Middle East, Islam is argued to be “a supra-state counter-hegemonic identity,” 
occasionally used by states aspiring to be regional hegemons “to unite the region 
against the global hierarchy.”300 The US priority to contain the exportation of the 
Iranian Islamic regime to the region can also be interpreted as an attempt to hinder the 
use of Islam as a supra-national identity to mobilize the region against the US 
hegemony. The transition from friendly to cold relations between the USA and Iran was 
most visible during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, where the USA decided to extend 
military support to Iraq in order to hinder the emergence of Iran as a strong regional 
power.301 While Iraq enjoyed the military support of the international community, Iran 
suffered both from the war itself and from the economic sanctions as well as arms 
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embargoes imposed on the regime.302 As a result, the war left Iran with high military 
and economic costs. Meanwhile, the USA maintained its security guarantees to Gulf 
States in exchange for Soviet containment, access to oil and the US non-intervention in 
their domestic regimes throughout 1980s.303 On the other hand, Iran distanced itself 
further from other states in the region by withdrawing from Baghdad Pact, ceasing its 
diplomatic relations with Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, and worsening its relationship 
with Israel.304 
 
 While Iran became militarily weakened, economically devastated and further 
isolated in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, Iraq emerged as the leading 
Arab power in the Gulf region with strong WMD and nuclear ambitions.305 However, 
Iraq still did not have the regional hegemon status and the whole region was under the 
influence of the USA. The Iraqi ambition to become a regional hegemon soon 
manifested itself with its invasion of Kuwait. First of all, Iraq revived the rhetoric of 
Arab nationalism in the region, by urging the oil rich Arab states to share their oil 
revenues with poorer Arab countries and not to allow the USA to use their bases.306 To 
the Iraqi strategic thinking, Kuwait seemed to be an “artificial state,” created by the 
Western powers with an attempt to hinder the Iraqi access to the Gulf.307 Therefore, the 
acquisition of Kuwait would give economic benefits to Iraq. On the part of the USA, 
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the Iraqi acquisition of Kuwait territory would lead Iraq to have “hegemony over 40 per 
cent of world oil reserves - at a time when American reserves had shrunk from 34 to 7 
per cent of the global total.”308  Moreover, the USA was aware that Iraq was not 
dependent on the USA unlike Saudi Arabia and it was using oil as a political tool to 
threaten the USA to pursue a favorable solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.309 Given 
the Iraqi threat of becoming a regional hegemon, the USA felt the need to re-ensure its 
hegemony over Middle Eastern oil and engaged in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 with 
Iraq.310 The rise of Iraq was restricted to an extent with the destruction of Iraqi military 
capabilities during the war and with ensuing trade sanctions and arms embargoes on 
Iraq.  
 
 Another powerful state in the region worth mentioning is Israel, who stood as 
the sole nuclear power holder in the region since 1967, and had increased its 
conventional military capabilities between 1974 and 1990 to a considerable extent.311 
One explanation about the Israeli nuclearization is the memory of the Holocaust, which 
had led the founders of the Israeli state to be over-concerned about the national security 
of Israel.312 While the regional isolation of the Israeli state due to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict might have fed the Israeli security calculations for nuclear weapons, it is 
suggested that Israel never wanted to use its nuclear capability in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict due to the “geographical asymmetry” between Arab countries on the one hand 
and the Israeli state on the other.313 Moreover, Israel has never fully acknowledged its 
nuclear capability. As a matter of fact, Israel played the “policy of opacity,” not signing 
the NPT, not declaring itself as a nuclear state, but at the same time giving occasional 
hints to other regional powers about its nuclear capabilities.314 The Israeli “policy of 
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opacity” has been responded by another “policy of opacity” by the US, who has not 
been insistent on the Israeli denuclearization due to the sensitivity of the issue to Israeli 
national security calculations, although it posed threats to its already established 
international nuclear status-quo.315   
 
 Iran had good relations with Israel prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979; 
however, the relations got on an ideological overtone during Ayatollah Khomeini era. 
Ayatollah Khomeini adopted the “Israel must be annihilated” rhetoric in the very first 
years of the revolution.316 The clerical elites of Iran rejected the legitimacy of the Israeli 
state due to the perceived threat posed by Zionism to the Muslim Middle East in 
general.317 This ideological opposition manifested itself as ideological, financial and 
military support by Iran to various terrorist organizations challenging the Israeli state. 
Apart from this ideological clash, there was no historical or existential enmity between 
two countries during 80s and 90s. Contrary to its close American ally, Israel seemed 
more concerned about the rise of the Iraqi state as the regional power than that of Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War years. In this respect, the Israeli bombing of Iraqi nuclear 
facility in Osirak of 1981 can be seen as an Israeli attempt to hinder the nuclearization 
of Iraq and its rise as a regional power. However, this attempt proved futile, as Iraq 
emerged as the great regional Arab power following the Iran-Iraq War. Although the 
ensuing Gulf War could hinder the rise of Iraq as a regional hegemon, Iraq still 
continued to be the major Arab power in the region.  
 
 While, the Middle Eastern power balances favored Iraq as the major Arab power 
and Israel as the sole nuclear power in the region, the fall of the Soviet Union marked a 
change both at the global level and in the Caspian and Caucasus regions. At the global 
level, the superpower rivalry ended; and as a result, the USA emerged as the single 
dominant global power. At the regional level, the Soviet influence on Muslim countries 
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in the Caucasus and Caspian regions such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
was released. Situated between the Caspian and Caucasus on the North and the Gulf 
region and Middle East on the East, Iran had a favorable geopolitical condition to exert 
its influence on those regions. The elimination of the Soviet influence on its northern 
border provided Iran with the opportunity to exert more influence on the newly 
independent countries. By taking advantage of the weakness of these newly established 
republics, Iran supported the Islamist movements and sought to increase its influence on 
the region.318      
 
 The fall of the Soviet Union created a fertile ground for Iran to exert more 
influence on the Caspian and Caucasus regions. However, the US presence in the 
Middle East did not diminish with the end of the global superpower rivalry. The 
existence of Israel as the sole nuclear power in the region; the diminished power of Iran 
due to the Iran-Iraq War, the economic sanctions, and the arms embargoes by the USA; 
and the status of Iraq as the major Arab power summarizes the power balances in the 
Middle East until 9/11. As such, the region lacked any regional hegemon and was 
marked by two types of states, which are the small Gulf States dependent on the USA 
and the revisionist bigger states challenging the status-quo set by the USA as the 
dominant global power.319 While Israel and Saudi Arabia were major US allies, Iran and 
Iraq ended up with nationalistic and independent foreign policies towards the USA as 
the global hegemon. A change in the regional and global security environment in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a redefinition of US security interests. With 
the subsequent US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, the power balances were 
disrupted in the region.        
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4.3 The Regional Balances in the Post-9/11 Period  
 
 
 4.3.1 The US Interests in the Region  
 
 
The Al-Qaeda attacks on the American territory in 2001 had far reaching effects on the 
Middle East. A redefinition of major US interests at the global and regional level led to 
crucial changes in the Middle Eastern regional balances specifically. While certain US 
priorities regarding the region remained unchanged during this period, some others got 
further emphasized in the post-9/11 American security documents. 
 
 In the post-9/11 period, the basic US interests and priorities for the Middle East 
region has been claimed to be countering terrorism, hindering the proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, maintaining “stability of oil supplies and prices,” 
ensuring the “domestic stability of pro-American regimes” and US-allies, ensuring 
Israel's security and promoting democracy and human rights.320 Since the terrorist 
attacks, the USA has seemed to direct most of its attention to combating terrorism in the 
Middle East. The basic rationale for focusing on the Middle East is the US contention 
that most of the global terrorist organizations extract their human resources and 
financial support from domestically unstable regimes in the region.321 Moreover, 
according to this US security doctrine, while extracting their resources from unstable 
Middle Eastern regimes, the terrorist organizations are also believed to reinforce anti-
Americanism in the region.322 Not only global terrorist organizations, but also state 
sponsored terrorism is perceived as a challenge to US interests in the region. In that 
respect, Iranian regime exportation rhetoric has long been categorized under state-
sponsored terrorism by the USA.323   
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 With the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the conventional capabilities of 
both states have deteriorated. Therefore, the USA as well as its close ally Israel stand as 
the greatest conventional weapons holders in the region today. The USA has currently 
200.000 forces only in Iraq and Afghanistan.324 Moreover, Israel has the qualitative 
superiority of conventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.325 The acquisition 
of WMD's by any other regional power may disrupt the US and Israeli military 
superiority in the region.326 Moreover, the US contention is that the WMD's may also 
pose a challenge to the regimes who enjoy US security guarantees in the region, thereby 
leading to a possible “loss of confidence” in the USA.327    
 
 Some regional pro-American regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman have always been an important part of the US 
security agenda due to their large oil reserves. However, it is estimated that the USA 
meets a large portion of its oil needs from Canada and Mexico, instead of these Middle 
Eastern countries.328 Still, oil has a strategic importance for the USA not only for 
domestic use, but it is also as a global commodity, which has strong implications for the 
integration of increasingly liberalizing developing countries with the world economy.329 
The oil shock of 1973 has shown that any political instability in the region such as the 
Arab-Israeli may have far reaching affects on the whole globe. The USA sees political 
stability in the region as a crucial factor to stabilize global oil prices and supply. 
Therefore, the maintenance of security guarantees to these pro-American regimes still 
plays an important role for the protection of the US oil interests in the region.  
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 The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is still an important issue for the USA. 
As the only democratic country in the Middle East, Israel has been perceived by the 
USA as the only projector of the US type political system in the region. Israel has been 
the greatest receiver of military and economic aid provided by the USA.330 However, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict is believed to create a challenge for the USA in maintaining its 
friendly relations both with Israel and with several Arab countries under US security 
umbrella.331 Therefore, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is believed to be 
advantageous to the USA for securing its other interests in the region.   
     
 Political transformation within the Middle Eastern regimes has become more 
accentuated in the US security doctrine in the post-9/11 period. In this respect, the 
promotion of democracy and human rights has been suggested as key themes of the US 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Scholars explain the US emphasis on democracy both 
in normative and pragmatic grounds. On the normative level, “political and economic 
freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law” have been designated as the 
core US values to be embraced by the whole world.332 On the practical level, the USA 
buys into democratic peace argument that democratic regimes rarely fight one another. 
One key rationale behind the US decision to bring down the authoritarian regime in Iraq 
was the US contention that a democratic Iraq would help spread democracy to other 
non-democratic states in the region.333 According to the US security calculations, this 
could have a long-term impact on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 
region.334 Moreover, democratic regimes are believed to bring more domestic stability. 
The argument is that when the interests of a larger segment of populations are voiced 
and met, there are fewer stakes for internal conflicts.335 By bringing stability, 
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democratization in the Middle East is believed to diminish the support to terrorist 
organizations in the region. However, it should also be recognized that the US political 
transformation ideal has received much criticism from academic scholars and the 
international community. The short-term influences of the US democratization ideal 
have proved highly problematic. The regime change in Iraq led to more instability than 
stability in the country, with which the USA could not manage. Moreover, the political 
transformation ideal has also been challenged as a superficial rationale masking the real 
American intentions for attaining material interests in the region, notably securing oil.   
 
 
4.3.2 The Economic and Military Balances in the post-9/11 Period 
 
 
A redefinition of US interests in the post-9/11 security environment led to a US 
intervention first in Afghanistan in 2001 and then in Iraq in 2003. The US rationale for 
the intervention in Afghanistan was to eliminate the Al-Qaeda terrorist establishment. 
The rhetoric of military intervention in Iraq, on the other hand, concentrated on the 
existence of WMD's and their possible supply to terrorist organizations in the region.  
 
 One not clearly acknowledged reason, on the other hand, was the rising 
dependency of the USA on oil, which could be eased with the invasion of Iraq as the 
possessor of large oil reserves. However, Saddam's regime stood as a barrier before the 
global markets' access to Iraqi oil.336 Moreover, a continued control over the Middle 
Eastern oil would have implications on the global power transitions. Several power 
transition researches have shown that China has the potential to become the next 
dominant power at the global level thanks to its swift rise in GDP levels.337 The 
alignment of Iraq with the US-led status-quo through an invasion would provide the 
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USA with “a new compliant swing producer” in the Middle East, thereby strengthening 
its hand in the face of a rising China.338 A Middle East closely aligned with the USA 
would secure the US interests in the region and reassert its dominance on the region in 
case of a possible confrontation with a rising China. While Iraq was the most powerful 
Arab country in the region before the US intervention, the economic and military 
devastation of the country led to a loss of regional status with the war. Similarly, the 
intervention in Afghanistan left this country with diminished military power in the 
region. 
 
 One puzzle the US intervention in Iraq left behind has been the power vacuum 
in the Gulf region. While the USA labeled Iran and Iraq as “rogue states” and adopted a 
policy of “dual containment” to both countries following the Gulf War, both rivals 
served to counterbalance one another in the region.339 From a US security perspective, a 
powerful Iraq could balance against a largely populated and oil-rich Iran, who has long 
embraced the Shiite regime exportation rhetoric.340 The fall of its life-long rival Iraq on 
its western border, and the fall of Afghanistan on its east could provide Iran with a 
space to become the potential regional power. The US intervention in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is not understandable as far as the possible rise of Iranian power is 
concerned.  
 
 A closer look at the economic and military power of the major states in the 
region seems to support this scenario. According to power transition theory, the GDP 
levels, military expenditures, size of the army, conventional weapons holdings and 
population size are the common denominators of a country's power. The Table 4.1 on 
GDP levels suggests that oil-rich Saudi Arabia has a higher GDP level. Although Iraq is 
also an oil-rich country, it experienced a severe drop in GDP during the 2003 Iraq War. 
While it could redeem its previous economic power starting from 2004, it is far beyond 
that of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel. As per 2009, Iran has the highest GDP among all 
four countries in the region. The Israeli economic power falls behind the oil-rich 
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countries in the region, excluding war-torn Iraq.  
 
 
 
  
As far as the military expenditures is concerned, Saudi Arabia has the highest military 
expenditure in the region. The second country spending much on military build-up is 
Israel. Iran ranks third in terms of military expenditures. Although 8.6 % of its GDP is 
allocated to military expenditures, Iraq 's military expenditures in US dollars fall behind 
that of Israel and Iran.341 The 2003 statistics on the number of military personnel 
suggests that the largest number of military personnel belongs to Iran. Israel falls 
behind Iran in terms of military personnel. While Iraq's number of military personnel in 
2002 was 397.000, which was close to that of Iran with 448.000, the number fell to 
50000 in 2003. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
341 “Worldwide Military Expenditures Database 2011,”  Global Security ewswire, accessed July 
21, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/spending.htm.   
STATES 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Iraq 86.0 89.5 84.0 56.2 91.4 97.9 111.3 115.7 128.9 151.5
Iran 407.6 419.4 464.9 500.7 560.5 660.5 726.3 834.5 913.1 894.9
Israel 129.0 130.9 131.2 135.3 144.5 160.5 174.3 188.1 199.6 205.8
Saudi Arabia 262.3 256.2 277.6 317.2 369.4 464.7 527.2 580.5 742.8 620.4
Table 4.1 Total GDP at Current Prices (in billion $)
Data taken from Penn World Table Database, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
STATES 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Iraq - - - - 2.0 2.8 2.3 2.0 5.2 4.1 4.6
Iran 7.8 8.5 6.1 7.5 9.2 11.4 12.7 10.4 7.0 - -
Israel 12.1 12.6 14.0 13.1 12.5 12.9 13.6 13.4 13.0 12.3 13.0
Saudi Arabia 24.7 26.3 23.1 23.2 25.8 31.1 35.5 40.9 40.1 41.2 42.9
Table 4.2 Total Military Expenditures in Million $ at 2008 Prices and Exchange Rate 
Data taken from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute http://www.sipri.org
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Although Iran has military superiority to Israel in terms of military personnel, Israel has 
a marked military superiority in terms of conventional weapons holdings. Due to arms 
embargoes on Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, Iran suffered in terms of 
conventional weapons build-up. It should be recognized that while the numbers given in 
the Table 4.4 are indicative of the conventional power discrepancy among four states, 
they fail to account for the US military impact on the region. Although Saudi Arabia 
seems to be weak in terms of conventional weapons capabilities, it is a major recipient 
of US security guarantees. The US military presence in Iraq following the Iraq War of 
2003, the US security guarantees to several Gulf States including Saudi Arabia render 
Iran even more limited in terms of conventional weapons capabilities. Israel's ballistic 
missile and nuclear weapons capabilities extend the military gap between Israel and 
Iran even farther. Israel possesses Jericho II and Jericho III long-range ballistic missiles, 
Dolphin submarines which are also speculated to be nuclear-capable cruise missiles and 
205 aircraft which are believed to be able to deliver nuclear weapons.342 As Israel does 
not openly announce itself as a nuclear state, the estimations about the number of 
nuclear warheads Israel is far from being definite. Still, the number of warheads is 
speculated to vary between 100 and 350.343 The quality of the nuclear capabilities is 
thought to be similar to that of India and Pakistan.344 
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STATES 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iraq 429000 423000 397000 50000
Iran 513000 478000 448000 440000
Israel 179000 181000 181000 183000
Saudi Arabia 140000 120000 110000 106000
Table 4.3 Total Number of Armed Personnell
Data taken from SIPRI Facts on International Relations and Security Trends Database, http://first.sipri.org/
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One advantage of Iran to all the Middle Eastern nations is its big population. The 2009 
data on population indicates that Iran has a population of 76 million, while Iraq has 29 
million and Saudi Arabia 23 million. Israel is the smallest state with a population of 7 
million.345 The numbers suggest that with its high GDP rates, big population and 
superiority of military personnel may render Iran a possible candidate to fill the power 
vacuum left by Iraq in the Gulf region in 2003. However, the numbers also indicate the 
limitations of Iran to attain that regional power status. First, Iran's economic functioning 
deserve more attention for a sound prediction of its prospect to become a regional 
power. Second, the weak conventional weapons capabilities of Iran cannot compete 
with the American presence in the region and the Israeli nuclear and missile 
capabilities. 
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Table 4.4 Total Number of Conventional Weapons Holdings
STATES 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iraq 7,780 7,340 6,820 7,080
Iran 6,040 6,650 6,600 5,960
Israel 15,430 17,370 17,490 17,730
Saudi Arabia 5,390 5,100 4,830 4,860
Data taken from SIPRI Facts on International Relations and Security Trends Database, http://first.sipri.org  
Table 4.5 Population
Country Population (million)
Israel 7
Iran 76
Iraq 29
Saudi Arabia 23
Data taken from World Penn Table
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Although Iran's total GDP level in US dollars is high, its GDP growth rate in 
percentages is rather low.346 As a matter of fact, Iran started industrialization long 
before most of its regional counterparts; however, its economy relies largely on oil.347 
The major industries include petroleum, petrochemicals, metal fabrication, textiles, 
cement and food processing such as sugar refining and vegetable oil production.348 The 
lack of diversification in the industrial sector has led to the emergence of a link between 
oil export rates and GDP growth rates. The “boom” and “bust” phases in oil export rates 
are directly reflected to GDP growth.349 Apart from oil dependency and lack of 
industrial diversification, another factor contributing to low GDP growth levels is the 
economic structure. The Iranian economy is run mostly by state enterprises, “para-
governmental organizations” such as bonyads, and foundations.350 Lack of a well-
functioning private sector, an inward-looking economy and oil-dependency lead to low 
levels of GDP growth rates in percentages. 
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Despite the low growth rates in GDP percentages and the oil-dependency of Iranian 
economy, Iran ranks the 19th economically most powerful nation and the 4th  largest oil 
producer in the world.351 With its oil-rich territory, large population, large amounts of 
military personnel and high GDP level, Iran far exceeds the Israeli, Saudi Arabian and 
Iraqi national power in terms of GDP, population, oil and military personnel. The 
primary factor that contributes to the Israeli state to become a counterbalancing power 
to the rise of Iran is its conventional weapons superiority and its nuclear and ballistic 
missile capabilities. In this respect, the attainment of nuclear capabilities may be 
conceived by Iran as a policy option to make up for the weakness of conventional 
weapons capabilities. While it is not clear whether Iran's nuclear program is intended 
for peaceful or military purposes, Iran already has a missile program. Although there is 
no “automatic relationship” between the missile program and nuclear program, the 
production of the missiles may also be used for firing nuclear warheads.352 In the late 
80s, Iran developed its first missile with the help of North Korea.353 Today, Iran has an 
active medium-range ballistic missile program.354 Within the scope of the program, Iran 
has so far developed the SHAHAB-3 missile and is now working on the SHAHAB-4 
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Table 4.6 Oil Production in Barrels Per Day (bbl/per day), 2009 Estimates 
Country Oil (bbl/per day)
Israel 3,806
Iran 4,172,000
Iraq 2,399,000
Saudi Arabia 9,764,000
Data taken from CIA World Fact Boook 
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and -5 versions of it.355  
 
 Given the superiority of Iran to Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia in terms of 
population, oil, size of the military personnel and GDP level, the nuclearization of Iran 
would mean a blow to the only counterbalancing factor to the conventional and nuclear 
superiority of Israel. Iran and Israel seem to be two possible candidates to fill the power 
vacuum left by Iraq in the aftermath of 2003 war in a region encircled by the USA. 
Nuclearization could provide Iran with a leverage to challenge the Israeli state as the 
nuclear hegemon of the region and to become a regional power. Therefore, the 
nuclearization of Iran with a large population, high GDP level, oil, and a favorable 
geopolitical condition could lead to a power transition in the region. 
 
 
4.4 The Global and Regional Status-Quo   
  
 
While the USA is the global dominant power, it has also dominance over the Middle 
East region both through its military presence in the region as well as its extended 
security umbrella to its two closest allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Power 
transition theory predicts that the global and regional status-quo is set by the global or 
regional dominant power. As the dominant power, the USA has sought to project its 
domestic political and economic system to the whole globe. In this respect, the US-led 
global and regional status-quos have similarities. 
 
 At the global level, the USA has actively engaged in the spread of democracy, 
the supremacy of international institutions, rule of law, respect for human rights and 
liberal market economy. The USA has had a marked success in the projection of its 
domestic economic regime. Governments have increasingly adopted liberal market 
economy, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. This economic status-quo set by 
the USA is vanguarded by three international institutions, which are World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO). These 
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institutions control the integration of newly emerging economies to the status-quo 
through established guidelines, rules and norms. The integration of the maximum 
number of countries to this economic status-quo means higher economic benefits for 
the USA. At the political level, the USA has long engaged in the spread of democracy 
and human rights discourse. A closer look at various international institutions such as 
the United Nations and WTO reveals the existence of democratic elements in the 
functioning of such institutions. The USA spreads its liberal norms through multiple 
human rights institutions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, European Court of Justice, among others.  
 
 In a similar vein, the USA also seeks to maintain the power balance established 
once it became the dominant power in the post-World War II period. The current NPT 
regime is a projection of the international military status-quo in 1960s and 70s, when 
the five nuclear power holders were determined as global great powers. By recognizing 
the possession of nuclear capabilities by five nuclear power holders at the time, the 
NPT created an exclusive club of nuclear states. It is no coincidence that the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council are the very five states who have the 
exclusive right of nuclear power. The NPT regime has sought to maintain this nuclear 
status-quo by declaring nuclear weapons acquisition by any other country as 
illegitimate. 
 
 The USA seeks to project the elements of the global status-quo in its dealings 
with the Middle East. The reformulation of US interests regarding the Middle East in 
the post-9/11 period proves this case. In the initial phases of its fight against terrorism, 
the USA first introduced “the axis of evil” rhetoric, addressing to three non-democratic 
regimes which are Iraq, Iran and North Korea. As a result, the USA not only linked the 
issue of terrorism and the search for weapons of mass destruction capabilities to non-
democratic regimes, but also created a legitimate space for the “regime change” 
rhetoric. The issue of terrorism and WMD's has direct security implications for the 
USA. The acquisition of WMD's, or even nuclear weapons, by terrorist organizations 
create a new security environment, where states are confronted by non-state actors. 
Given the decentralized and non-territorial organization, the unpredictable and not 
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easily detectable behavior of terrorist groups, they pose a challenge to any US strategy 
for retaliation. Besides such security concerns, the US imposition of democracy as a 
strategy to solve the security problems in the region also shows its projection of 
American domestic political system to the international arena.          
      
  For the USA, another meaning of securing the regional status-quo in the Middle 
East means the preservation of the current military and political balances in the region 
to its advantage. The USA would want to preserve its close ally Israel's position as the 
sole nuclear power in the region, as Israel is the only regional power that has been 
integrated into the US status-quo. With its democratic government, highly liberal 
economy and Western style military capabilities, Israel is backed by the USA as the 
only country in the region which has been successfully integrated to the US led status 
quo. Moreover, its nuclear power renders Israel as the most powerful state in the region. 
Apart from Israel, the friendly relations with an oil-rich Gulf States including Saudi 
Arabia would protect the US interests about oil supply and price stability in the region. 
Any instability among oil-rich Gulf States may lead to oil price and supply instability in 
the region, which would in turn have repercussions over the functioning of the liberal 
market economy globally. Iraq has also been aligned with the USA since the 2003 War, 
thereby reasserting the US dominance on the majority of Middle Eastern oil. The 
alignment of Iraq with the USA provides the USA with the opportunity to re-assure its 
position as the dominant power over the Middle Eastern oil in the face of China as a 
rising global power. Iran stands as the only major country to pursue an independent and 
nationalist foreign policy in the region. Moreover, Iran is politically, economically and 
ideologically isolated from the global status-quo in many respects. The nuclearization 
of Iran may pose a challenge both to the military superiority of Israel and to the US 
interests in the region. A nuclear Iran can lead to a power transition in the region, which 
could mean a blow to the US led status-quo in the region, from which USA derives 
economic and political benefits. Moreover, the nuclearization of Iran can also affect the 
global power transitions, by challenging the US control over the Middle Eastern oil in 
the face of a rising China.  
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 4.5 Is Iran Dissatisfied with the Status-Quo?       
 
 
The power transition theory assumes that the existence of a rising power does not 
necessarily lead to a conflictual power transition. The rising power's stance towards the 
status-quo established by the dominant power is the main factor determining the nature 
of the transition. Therefore, the Iranian stance towards the global and regional status-
quo set and led by the USA is important to better analyze the nuclear issue between Iran 
and the USA.  
 
 Iran has a favorable geopolitical situation thanks to its location between the 
Middle East, the Gulf region and the Caspian Basin. Despite its favorable geopolitical 
situation, coupled with its relatively high GDP levels, a large population and oil supply, 
Iran does not enjoy the leading power status in the region. Some scholars have brought 
into attention the Iranian ambition to become a leading power and to have a greater say 
in the regional affairs in explaining the Iranian nuclear program.356 Especially since the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran is very isolated in the region. The USA has pursued a 
policy of isolation towards Iran with the trade and arms embargoes or by denying 
international financial institutions' help to this country during turmoil years. Iran's 
feeling of isolation also resonates at the regional level. Iran is a non-Arab and Shiite 
state, which has made it difficult for it to find strategic allies among Arab countries in 
the region.357 That is why Iran has sought to have good relations with India and China 
with an attempt to counterbalance its tense relations with the USA in the last couple of 
years.358 Moreover, a quest for legitimacy, prestige and technological development has 
also comprised Ayatollah Khamenei's rhetoric on the need for a nuclear program.359 Iran 
clearly sees an advanced nuclear program, whether for peaceful or military purposes, as 
an indicator of being an self-dependent, modern and technologically advanced country. 
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Therefore, it might be suggested that the Iranian ambition to attain a regional leading 
power status is an important rationale behind the Iranian nuclear program. 
 
 Power transition scholars have suggested various ways to measure a state's 
dissatisfaction with the status-quo. This study will employ multiple variables to analyze 
the Iranian stance towards the US-led status-quo. The similarity of domestic systems, 
dissatisfaction with the international norms and institutions, membership to regional 
and international institutions and military build-up are the variables that explain the 
Iranian stance towards the global status-quo. The variable of domestic systems 
similarity acts as an overarching variable explaining the shifts in Iranian dissatisfaction 
with the global status-quo and also in its dealings with the international community on 
the nuclear crisis. Therefore, a discussion on domestic bureaucratic changes is also 
necessary to understand the course of the nuclear crisis.  
 
 
 4.5.1 Similarity of Domestic Systems 
 
 
The first variable to analyze Iran's dissatisfaction with the global status-quo is the 
similarity of domestic systems variable. Buchta suggests that some Western observers 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran depict it as a “monolithic dictatorship with totalitarian 
tendencies, ruled by the Islamic clergy.”360 However, such a simplified depiction of Iran 
misses “the complex structure of Iranian politics.”361 As a matter of fact, the Iranian 
regime is not easy to categorize either as an authoritarian or a democratic regime. The 
Islamic Republic is characterized by a duality of power since 1979 Revolution. The 
state is structured in a way that it embodies both religious and secular elements. While 
executive, legislative and judicial bodies of a democratic regime are existent in the state 
structure; all these elements have a twin body controlled by the clergy. For instance, the 
country is ruled both by a Supreme Leader appointed by the Islamic Shiite clergy and a 
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president directly elected by the Iranian people. Similarly, there is a directly elected 
assembly, which is subject to another assembly controlled by the clergy. Therefore, the 
regime possesses both secular and theocratic elements. 
 
 However, the USA has treated Iran more as a theocracy than a democracy. 
Linking the issues of terrorism and WMD proliferation to the instability of non-
democratic regimes, the USA engaged in a policy of political change in the Middle 
East. The first target of this policy was Iraq, which underwent a regime change with 
2003 Iraq War. Encircled by the US military on its western and eastern front, Iran felt 
the next target would be itself. The US government under Bush administration had 
categorized Iran under “axis of evil” states and the Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld had adopted“regime change” rhetoric against these “axis of evil” states.362 
President Khatami of the time had voiced its concerns that the next target following the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom would be Iran.363 The regime change rhetoric is highly 
disturbing for the Iranian political elite, for whom the preservation of the Islamic 
regime established by the 1979 Revolution is number one priority. Economically, the 
country has a closed economy, most of whose enterprises are owned and controlled by 
the state. Although there is a limited private sector, most of the existing private 
enterprises are controlled by bonyads and other revolutionary associates. Ideologically, 
the Islamic character of the regime puts it at odds with the Western ideals of human 
rights. In short, Iran's domestic political and economic system is highly different than 
that of the USA.  
 
 The power transition theory suggests that the rising power becomes dissatisfied 
with the status-quo set by the dominant power, when the status-quo does not yield any 
benefits to the rising power. Iran's concern about the preservation of its regime may be 
seen as a national security issue, which is common to all modern states. Still, the Iranian 
concern about its regime also has certain ideological and material aspects. Ideologically, 
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the regime is committed to the Revolutionary ideals of military self-reliance, economic 
self-sufficiency, nationalism and anti-imperialism. Although not all, some of these 
Revolutionary ideals stand at odds with the US status-quo in economic terms. In her 
seminal work Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel 
Solingen suggests that the domestic coalitions' response to “internationalization” is the 
main determinant of nuclear behavior.364 Leaders and ruling coalitions favoring 
internationalization have greater incentives to “avoid the political, economic, 
reputational and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons, because costs impair 
their domestic agenda.”365 On the other hand, leaders and ruling coalitions favoring 
nuclearization tend to reject internationalization and use nukes to maintain their 
political position at the domestic level, which has indeed been the case with inward 
oriented Middle East countries that relied on economic self-sufficiency, nationalist 
values and regime survival.366 In the Iranian case, groups closely associated with the 
Revolutionary Guards Officials, Pasdaran and bonyads largely benefit from an inward-
looking economy and military self-reliance. The Pasdaran has engaged in the trade of 
black market goods which have been embargoed by the USA such as construction 
goods, Western clothing and electronics.367 Similarly, Pasdaran and bonyads have set up 
their own military and industrial enterprises.368 Having a privileged position in the 
military and economic functioning of the Iranian state, these groups oppose to 
internationalization. It is clear that the integration into global economic status-quo 
counters the benefits of certain groups in Iran; thereby creating a dissatisfaction with it. 
This has repercussions on the nuclear issue as well, as the very groups who benefit 
much from the existing inward-looking economic regime also favor nuclearization and 
military self-reliance to having good relations with the international community. 
 
 In conclusion, the American ambition to project its political and economic 
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system to a politically and economically inward-looking Iran by relying on “axis of evil 
”and“ regime change rhetoric creates high dissatisfaction within the regime. Iran avoids 
integration to the global status-quo, as certain domestic groups who are mostly 
associated with the Revolutionary cadre do not yield material benefits from it.  
 
  
 4.5.2 Dissatisfaction with International orms 
 
 
The second indicator of Iranian dissatisfaction with the global status-quo is 
dissatisfaction with international norms. In this context, the Iranian stance towards the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime tells much about Iranian dissatisfaction with some 
international norms. Iran is a member of International Atomic Energy Agency and party 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While Iranian membership to IAEA and NPT suggests 
that Iran has always been integrated to the international nuclear status-quo, there is also 
evidence that Iran is not fully satisfied with this nuclear status-quo. 
 
 At the outset of its establishment, the NPT outlawed the attainment of nuclear 
technology for military purposes except for the five countries that had already gone 
nuclear. The Treaty also stipulated a commitment by these five nuclear holders to 
gradually diminish their nuclear arsenals. As a matter of fact, the USA and Russia have 
signed a series of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, known as START I, START II and 
START III, with which they diminished their intercontinental and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles and limited the number of their nuclear warheads.369 Still, none of 
these five countries completely have eliminated their military nuclear capabilities. Iran 
sees the existence of an exclusive nuclear club of five countries, who are permanent UN 
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Security Council members at the same time, as hypocrisy.370 Moreover, Pakistan, India 
and Israel have never signed the NPT and have gone nuclear, thereby avoiding any 
integration to the international nuclear status-quo. Although India and Pakistan were 
been subject to various sanctions following their nuclear tests, the Bush administration 
lifted most of those sanctions in exchange for cooperation on fight against terrorism.371 
On the other hand, Israel has never been subject to pressure by the international 
community due to its nuclear opacity. Iran sees the inconsistency in the application of 
the NPT regime as double-standards and voices its dissatisfaction with it.  
 
 Iran is dissatisfied with the US led NPT regime due to its creation of nuclear-
haves and have-nots. The nuclear status-quo established by the NPT regime serves to 
the benefit of five nuclear power holders by preserving their preferential status within 
the system and denies the attainment of that preferential status to others. While these 
five nuclear power holders enjoy the security and status provided by the nuclear 
weapons, Iran neither enjoys that security nor the status. Not deriving any political and 
material benefit from the NPT regime, Iran challenges the international nuclear status-
quo with its nuclear program.  
 
 
 4.5.3 Membership to International and Regional Organizations 
 
 
Another indicator of Iranian dissatisfaction with the regional and global status-quo is its 
membership to international and regional organizations. Iran has sought to isolate itself 
from certain international organizations, as it saw them as vehicles of globalization 
under a world-wide American hegemony.372 Such an isolationist stance was compatible 
with the Revolutionary ideals of military and economic self-reliance. Moreover, the 
foreign policy of self-reliance had material implications for Iran. Military self-reliance 
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proved to be a necessity for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, when the international 
community extended military assistance to Iraq but not to Iran. While anti-Americanism 
had been present since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, it became more 
emphasized in the Iranian foreign policy thinking following the fall of the Soviet 
Union. With the end of the Cold War, the bipolar world order was temporarily replaced 
by a unipolar world order dominated by the USA at the top. Since then, “Iranian policy 
debate refuses to accept the emergence of an international system dominated by a single 
hostile superpower and it rejects the idea of a unipolar world order, arguing that the 
bipolar should give way rather to a multipolar order.”373 Therefore, Iran has sought to 
have good relations with other great powers such as Russia, China, India and Europe; 
and took part in organizations not dominated by the USA such as the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM),374 Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).375  
 
 At the regional level, Iranian integration to regional organizations in the Middle 
East does not look promising. Most of the regionalism initiatives in the Middle East 
have been led by and centered around Arab states. Iran as a non-Arab and Shiite 
country, trying to export its regime to the region, was excluded from these regional 
organizations in the early years of its foundation. Moreover, Iran also isolated itself 
from these Arab-led organizations due to the fact that most of member Arab countries 
were US allies. As a result, Iran has no current membership to the major regional 
organizations such as the Arab League, Council of Arab Economic Unity and the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Today, Iran is only a member of 
OIC and OPEC in the Middle East region. While Iran's integration to the Middle 
Eastern regional blocks is not promising, Iran has sought to integrate itself to regional 
blocks in the Central Asia and the Far East. For instance, Iran is a member of Economic 
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Cooperation Organization (ECO), which is an economic block promoting trade and 
investment among Asian and Eurasian countries.376 Moreover, Iran has the observer 
status in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. 
 
 Iran has particularly good relations with China in many spheres. Politically, both 
Iran and China has regarded “the US policy of liberal interventionism as 'imperialist' 
and 'hegemonic'.”377 Therefore, partnership with China raised the promises of a “great 
power patron” for Iran, as an alternative to the Iran-US partnership which ended with 
the closure of the Shah era.378 This partnership has also fitted well with the Iranian 
vision of a multipolar world system not dominated by the USA. Iran has declared the 
existing Western-dominated world order as “worn-out” and “unfair” in nature and 
suggested that China-Iran partnership can have important implications for the 
establishment of a new world order.379 The Iranian reasoning is that the rise of China at 
the global level would provide Iran with “greater space to pursue its national 
ambitions.”380 Economically, the growing dependency of an economically rising China 
on oil imports from the Middle East provides both countries with greater room for 
energy partnership.381 Militarily, China has been a major supplier of conventional 
weapons to Iran.382 China has also assisted the Iranian nuclear program with nuclear 
technology transfer for peaceful purposes.  
 
 Iranian integration into regional and international organizations reflecting a 
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multipolar world order rather than a unipolar one led by the USA indicates that Iran is 
dissatisfied with the global status-quo. Iran's choice of international organizations not 
dominated by the USA such as the Non-Aligned Movement and Economic Cooperation 
Organization supports the argument that Iran is dissatisfied with the US led status-quo 
and seeks new avenues where it could be recognized as an independent and equally 
developed power.  
 
 
 4.5.4 Military Build-up     
 
 
One variable that demonstrates Iranian dissatisfaction with the status-quo is its military 
build-up. Iran has advanced missile capabilities and an ambitious missile development 
program. It possesses Scud B and -C missile forces as well as the Chinese CSS-8 short 
range missiles.383 Moreover, Iran also has the SHAHAB-3, which is a medium-range 
missile.384 Iran is engaging in a further military build-up as its current work on the 
SHAHAB-4 and -5 suggests.385 Apart from Scud's and SHAHAB's, Iran is believed to 
develop long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities which can probably 
shoot targets as far as the American continent.386 While the Scuds missiles were already 
used during the war with Iraq, the SHAHAB missiles build-up is believed to be targeted 
at the American military presence in the region.387  
 
 Power transition scholars take into account any territorial dispute between the 
challenger and the rising power in their measurement of dissatisfaction. While there has 
been no open territorial dispute between Iran and the USA, the increasing American 
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military presence on its eastern and western border, coupled by the American “regime 
change” rhetoric, is a prominent dynamic behind Iranian missile build-up. As a matter 
of fact, Iran is reported to have been increasingly extending its missile capabilities.388  
The existing missiles are said to be able to cover 1240 miles, which means they can 
shoot the American military installations in the region, including the Israeli military 
establishments.389 Although Iran is still not fully self-sufficient in building its defense 
mechanisms, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi expressed that it has increasingly 
become self-reliant in “designing, producing and using various kinds of missiles based 
on domestic knowledge.”390 A few days after Vahidi's remarks, Iran tested some 
medium-range missiles on the Indian Ocean.391 Apart from the missile capabilities, Iran 
has recently revealed its extensive underground missile launch capabilities, which 
requires a level of technological knowledge as advanced as building the missiles 
themselves.392 
 
 The Iranian engagement in missile build-up is usually associated with its nuclear 
program. Although there is no direct relationship between a nuclear program and a 
missile program, an extensive missile program is seen as a sign of nuclear proliferation 
due to their possible use for firing nuclear warheads. Iran is insistent that its nuclear 
program is only for peaceful energy purposes. However, Iran has already exceeded the 
uranium level that is sufficient for energy production. The disclosure of secret nuclear 
sites, coupled by exceeding uranium enrichment levels creates a suspicion on the part of 
the international community that Iran might be going nuclear. Tehran has recently 
announced that it is deploying more advanced uranium centrifuges, which has again 
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triggered fears that Iran might be going ahead with a weapons development program.393 
Moreover, the IAEA inspections on the Iranian nuclear sites had disclosed the existence 
of Pakistani nuclear material on the Iranian facilities, which meant a technological and 
scientific communication between Iran and A.Q Khan Network. Similarly, the Israeli 
sources assert that there is currently a closer cooperation between North Korea and Iran 
on nuclear activity for military purposes.394 Israeli sources claim that Iran would only 
benefit from the Russian aid, if its program was for peaceful purposes only.395 The fear 
shared by the international community is that Iran might be following the North Korean 
path of nuclearization, who denied that its nuclear program had a military aspect and 
only declared itself as a nuclear state after it had completed its first nuclear capability.  
 
 While it is still unclear whether Iran's nuclear program is oriented towards 
developing nuclear weapons, the advancement in its missile technology may be taken as 
an indicator of dissatisfaction with the status-quo. If Iran develops a nuclear program 
not peaceful but for military purposes, the nuclear weapons may make up for its 
weakness in conventional weapons. This could provide a credible deterrence capability 
for Iran against the US military presence in the region as well as against Israel.   
 
 
 4.5.5 Trends in the Iranian Dissatisfaction with Status-Quo 
 
 
The above analysis has indicated that domestic systems similarity, integration with the 
international norms, membership to international and regional organizations, and 
military build-up are the indicators of Iranian dissatisfaction with the regional and 
international status-quo set up by the USA as the single dominant power. Power 
transition scholars argue that the attainment of power parity or near power parity with 
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the dominant power is not enough for the emergence of conflictual power transition 
among powers. Only a congruence of power parity with the rising power's 
dissatisfaction with the status-quo is determinant on the escalation of the issue into an 
armed conflict. The Iranian dissatisfaction with the status-quo manifests itself in its 
relations with the international community on the resolution of the nuclear issue. The 
Iranian relations with the international community on the resolution of the nuclear issue 
have exhibited ups and downs since 2003. While Iran pursued a rather conciliatory 
nuclear foreign policy in its negotiations with international community before 2005, it 
adopted a more conflictual stance starting from 2005. This shift can be explained with 
reference to the changes in the domestic politics.396 The four variables explaining a 
rising power's dissatisfaction with the status-quo do not stand on their own, but are 
bound by the perceptions of the domestic policy makers. In other words, the strength of 
these four variables may change in accordance with the domestic policy makers' 
perception of and response to them. As a result, there is a correlation between the ups 
and downs in relations and domestic political groups' level of dissatisfaction with the 
status-quo.  
 
 An analysis of the pre-2005 and post-2005 will show that Iranian dealings with 
the international community over its nuclear issue exhibit differences between both 
period. This difference can be explained by the domestic factions' levels of 
dissatisfaction with the status-quo. The Iranian domestic political groups' level of 
dissatisfaction with the international status-quo has important implications for the 
course of relations with the international community on the resolution of the nuclear 
crisis.  
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4.5.5.1 Pre-2005 Period uclear Decision Making in Iran 
 
 
Iran's relations with the international community over its nuclear program in the pre-
2005 period reflect elements of pragmatism, moderation and conciliation. Although the 
government at the time was committed to the continuation of the nuclear program for 
peaceful purposes, it preferred cooperation with the international community for the 
resolution of the issue. 
 
 When the Bushehr and Arak nuclear facilities were discovered in 2002, 
Mohammad Khatami was serving as the president. During his presidency, Khatami 
represented the reformist faction of the population. He sought to pursue a realist and 
pragmatic rather than a value-driven foreign policy. Among his foreign policy 
objectives was to diminish Iran's isolation, to revive the domestic economy through 
international financial agreements, and to establish more dialogue and cooperation with 
the external world.397 Khatami's approach to the Iranian nuclear issue was also 
pragmatic in that he favored diplomatic negotiations as a key to avoid confrontation 
with the international community and further international isolation.  
 
 Up until mid-2003, AEOI was the agency responsible for both the political and 
technical aspects of the nuclear program.398 However, in mid-2003 Iran felt that “the 
gravity of the negotiations required high-level official attention,” thereby leading to the 
meeting of Supreme National Security Council for the first time to discuss the nuclear 
crisis.399 The nuclear decision-making elite then decided that one person should 
coordinate all the committees involved in the nuclear issue.400 Foreign Minister Kamal 
Kharrazi recommended Hassan Rowhani, who served both as the nuclear negotiator and 
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the secretary of the SNSC.401 Upon insistence both by the Supreme Leader Khamenei 
and President Khatami, Rowhani took on the responsibility.402   
 
  Under Rowhani as the primary manager of the nuclear issue, Iran started 
negotiations with EU3- Germany, UK and France. The first set of bilateral diplomatic 
meetings in 2003 ended with Iran's promise to temporarily suspend its uranium 
enrichment activities.403 This was subsequently formalized with the Paris Agreement, 
under which Iran promised to sign the Additional Protocol of NPT, to fully comply with 
the IAEA inspections and to stop all its enrichment and processing related activities.404 
Iran signed the Additional Protocol of NPT in December 2003, in Vienna, which gave 
the IAEA officials extended authority of access to a country's nuclear related sites and 
to all nuclear related information.405 Foreign Minister Kharrazi often emphasized “the 
need for the settlement of the issue” through “full cooperation with IAEA,” “confidence 
building,” “transparency” and “dialogue” in their dealing with the international 
community on the nuclear issue.406  
 
 In a speech delivered to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, Rowhani 
explained the rationales behind the temporary suspension decision. Rowhani was 
concerned about the referral of the issue to UN Security Council and pursued a 
pragmatist foreign policy strategy to delay it as long as possible. Rowhani states that 
there had been an emerging international consensus on the need to stop Iran's nuclear 
program.407 Given the US efforts to refer the issue to the UN Security Council, this 
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international consensus could be culminated by the imposition of economic sanctions 
on Iran.408 Rowhani was aware of the implications of any confrontation with the 
international community leading to economic sanctions on the Iranian public, who has 
already been affected by economic problems resulting from Iran's international isolation 
since the Revolution.409 As a reformist president, Khatami was committed to the 
reformist ideal of opening the country more to the external world. His reformist 
supporters declared that “integration into the international order and the global 
economy mandates accepting certain restrictions on [Iran's] nuclear program.”410 The 
US proposal for Iran's WTO membership and the EU-3 packages offering extended 
trade relations was appealing to the reformist supporters of Khatami.411  
 
 The analysis shows that Iran under the reformist Khatami rule was more open to 
integration with the status-quo. The reformist political elites had certain economic 
benefits to be derived from the status-quo. They adopted a pragmatic approach towards 
globalization and opening the country to the outside world. As the incentives put 
forward by the USA and the EU seemed beneficial, they agreed to temporarily suspend 
the nuclear program. In conclusion, Iran's dissatisfaction with the international status-
quo was lower in the pre-2005 period. As a result, the resolution of the nuclear issue 
with the international community seemed more probable under the rule of a relatively 
satisfied government. 
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4.5.5.2 Post-2005 Period uclear Decision-Making in Iran 
 
      
Iran's moderate and pragmatic foreign policy approach to the handling of the nuclear 
issue underwent changes in the post-2005 period. Iran adopted an outright 
confrontational attitude towards the international community when the hardliner faction 
gained power. The presidential elections resulted in the victory of hardliner president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on August 2, 2005. On August 5, EU-3 proposed a new 
incentive package offering economic cooperation and security guarantees in return for 
Iran's suspension of its nuclear activities.412 Ahmadinejad immediately rejected the 
proposal as “ridiculous and disparaging” and “irrevocably” resumed uranium 
processing activities on August 8.413   
 
 “Seeking to put his own imprint on foreign policy,” Ahmadinejad made 
significant changes in the composition of the SNSC.414 A former IRGC veteran himself 
in Iran-Iraq War, Ahmadinejad appointed former IRGC officials to various ministerial 
positions including the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Commerce.415 This has 
largely transformed the composition of the SNSC to the advantage of hardliners. Apart 
from these ministerial positions in the cabinet, Ahmadinejad also appointed former 
IRGC officials to prominent positions within the SNSC, such as the spokesman of the 
SNSC and as deputy heads of SNSC.416 Ahmadinejad was committed to the 
revolutionary ideals of protecting the country against external enemies and of 
preserving the country's military self-reliance. As Dueck emphasizes, “the international 
indifference to Saddam’s war crimes and Tehran’s lack of an effective response has led 
Iran’s war veteran President to perceive that the security of his country cannot be 
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predicated on global opinion and treaties.”417 Ahmadinejad saw EU as acting at the 
behest of the United States and IAEA, who are, in Ahmadinejad's words, “bullies 
determined to prevent Iran's progress and advancement.”418 As a result, Ahmadinejad 
breached the Paris Agreement, declined EU's new incentive packages offering 
economic cooperation and security guarantees, resumed uranium enrichment activities, 
and “adopted a more belligerent posture towards the EU, the IAEA and the United 
States.”419 Since Ahmadinejad's coming to power in late 2005, Iran has also ignored the 
international threats to stop the enrichment program, either in the form of UN sanctions 
or U.S. military strikes.420  
 
 The hardliners had certain material benefits to be gained from the revolutionary 
ideology of non-integration with the international community, military and economic 
self-reliance and nationalism. For instance, the IRGC has an extensive economic and 
military power in Iran. Their economic interests emanate from their monopoly on the 
importation of certain forbidden and expensive items from Iranian ports which they 
control.421 Enjoying their increasing prosperity gained through this monopoly, IRGC 
opposes to opening the state's economy to the outside world.422 As such, Ahmadinejad 
feeds the IRGC by deepening the protectionist, anti-capitalist, inward-looking state 
economy.423 Both for Ahmadinejad and the IRGC, the international community's stance 
towards the Iranian nuclear program created “a feeling of injustice, e.g., US double 
standards, the West versus the technological have-nots.”424  
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 IRGC's material interests for defying conciliation with the international 
community on the nuclear issue are not limited to their stakes in an inward-looking 
economy. IRGC has had military interests in furthering the nuclear program. In 1982, 
IRGC established its own weapons organization, which is independent from the regular 
Iranian military.425 Moreover, they have established their own defense industry.426 
IRGC's insistence on the uranium enrichment activities, which is key to the 
development of nuclear material for military purposes, can be seen as a reflection of 
IRGC's stakes in their own defense industry.  
 
  Iranian nuclear program became increasingly politicized under Ahmadinejad's 
presidency. The main nuclear issue dividing the domestic politics into two camps was 
whether Iran should continue as “a revolutionary state willing to defy the world,” or 
whether it should become “a normal state playing by international rules.”427 While 
reformists and traditionalists were on the same camp, favoring a more conciliatory 
attitude to the West, the hardliners, who were holding the political power, opted for a 
more hardened nuclear foreign policy. The Iranian dissatisfaction with the international 
community increased in the post-2005 period due to a revival of revolutionary ideals 
under the increasing political influence of the revolutionary cadre. This dissatisfaction 
was reflected on the Iranian dealings with the international community. The relations 
between Iran and the international community became tenser during this period. 
Believing that diplomatic negotiations with Iran have proved unsuccessful for the 
suspension of the nuclear program, the EU and the USA did not propose any other 
incentive packages to Iran. Instead, the nuclear issue was referred to the UN Security 
Council, which passed four rounds of sanctions on Iran, targeting its military and 
economic activities.         
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4.6 The US Policy Options against Rising Iranian Power and Dissatisfaction 
 
 
Iran's insistence on its nuclear program despite the increasing pressure by the 
international community for its suspension can be explained by its ambitions to acquire 
a regional dominant power status. Given its increasing GDP levels, high population and 
oil-rich territory, Iran wants to have a greater say in the region. Israel and Iran seem to 
be the major candidates to fill the power vacuum left after Iraq War. The Israeli 
conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities render it advantageous, compared to 
Iran. On the other hand, Iran has a weakness in conventional military capabilities.  A 
nuclear option can not only make up for the weakness of Iran's conventional capabilities 
but also strengthen Iran's hand against the US presence in the region as well as Israel. 
Therefore, a nuclear option can increase the Iranian stakes to become a regional power. 
Iran's relative power in the region is coupled by dissatisfaction with the US led status-
quo both at the regional and international level. The above given analysis shows that 
there is a correlation between the Iranian dissatisfaction with the status-quo and the 
course of the nuclear talks between Iran and the international community. When the 
Iranian dissatisfaction with the status-quo in economic, political and ideological terms 
increases, it adopts a more hardened position towards the international community and 
stakes for the resolution of the nuclear issue decrease.  
 
 The USA as the dominant power is aware of the Iranian dissatisfaction with the 
status-quo and its strong ambition to challenge it. The USA is also aware that Iranian 
insistence on its nuclear program derives from its ambitions to challenge the status-quo 
and achieve a power transition. The power transition literature argues that the main 
concern of the dominant power at the international arena is to maintain the stability of 
the status-quo.428 There are two options before the dominant power to preserve the 
status-quo against any challenger, either integration or armed conflict. Depending on 
the capability and willingness of the challenger to enter into an armed conflict with the 
dominant power, the dominant power usually prefers integration over conflict as the 
                                                 
428 Tammen et. al., “Power Transition and US-China Conflicts,” 37. 
 
111 
 
initial policy option. In other words, “a hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation 
imposes high costs for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for 
integration.”429 Integration was the policy option adopted by the USA in the post-World 
War II period in Europe. By spreading the ideas of liberal democracy and market 
economy, the USA hindered the emergence of any conflict with Germany and Japan as 
rising challengers.430 Power transition theory assumes that conflict can erupt even in the 
case of a strong asymmetry between the dominant power and the challenger; however 
the conflict would not be as destructive as a conflict between two powers that have 
power parity.431         
  
  Given the Iranian missile build-up and its advancement in nuclear enrichment 
activities, Iran might be preparing itself for any attack from the USA or Israel. The USA 
has three specific policy options to hinder any military confrontation with Iran. The first 
policy option is that the USA may delay the timing of power parity with Iran. Iran  
enjoys high GDP rates. However, when compared to its Middle Eastern counterparts,  
the GDP growth rate in percentages is not that high. Moreover, while Iran has high 
revenues from oil, its sole dependence on oil renders it vulnerable to any oil crisis. A 
secure way for Iran to increase its capabilities is through its missile and nuclear 
technology. As a matter of fact, the USA has targeted Iran's nuclear program and oil 
business through sanctions, with an attempt to curb its power rise. The US insistence on 
the suspension of the Iranian nuclear program can be explained with the US ambition to 
hinder the rise of Iran, thereby avoiding any power transition at the regional level.  
 
 Secondly, the USA may integrate Iran into the international status-quo at the 
political, economic and ideological level. A key point for the USA is to avoid any 
integration attempt that may cause a  binary opposition with Iran. Therefore, instead of 
binary negotiations, the USA can encourage multilateral attempts to integrate Iran into 
the status-quo. As a matter of fact, the USA has so far adopted this strategy in its 
dealings with Iran on the nuclear issue, by encouraging the EU-3 to negotiate with Iran. 
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During the EU-3-Iran negotiations, the EU-3 offered some incentives to Iran in 
exchange for its suspension of its nuclear program. Such incentives included an 
extensive cooperation in various areas such as trade, nuclear energy and oil. Moreover, 
the organization of a conference on the resolution of Middle Eastern security problems 
was also on the incentive list. These incentives proved useful during the rule of by the 
reformist faction, who would derive material benefits from integrating with the global 
economic status-quo. On the other hand, the incentives proved futile when the 
hardliners attained power, who would derive material benefits from isolating the 
country from the global status-quo. The second policy option to integrate Iran into the 
global status-quo was the use of sanctions. In this respect, the USA not only adopted 
unilateral sanctions, but also encouraged the UN to impose multilateral sanctions on 
Iran. The timing of the unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed on Iran coincides 
with the rise of Iranian dissatisfaction. Still, the sanctions also proved futile, as the 
hardliner camp did not feel affected by most of the sanctions, as they had already 
established their monopoly on various industries including the military.  
 
 Third, the international community can present incentives that would be 
appealing to reformists and traditional conservatives in Iran. As a matter of fact, the 
hardliners' ideological foreign policy during Ahmadinejad's rule has not gone 
unchallenged domestically. Iran's one of top religious authorities, Ayatollah Hussein Ali 
Montazeri criticized Ahmadinejad's fixation on the nuclear issue by stating that nuclear 
technology should be “obtained in a way that will not create other problems, and 
without giving others an excuse to harm them.”432 Similarly, the expediency Council 
Member Mohammed Hashemi of the reformist Kargozaran party said that Ahmadinejad 
was unable to prevent the USA from referring the issue to UN Security Council. He 
emphasized that “with its next steps, America will realize all its aspirations with respect 
to Iran;” and therefore, they needed “skilled, experienced and moderate individuals to 
save the country from crisis."433 The former chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee 
in the Supreme National Security Council, who was a member of the nuclear 
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negotiating team during Khatami's time, criticized the current government's position for 
not being based on rational calculation.434 Given the internal divisions on the nuclear 
foreign policy, the international community can strengthen the hand of factions that are 
more open to integration with the global status-quo in Iran. Although this would not 
fully hinder the Iranian progress in its nuclear program, Iran could become more willing 
to resolve the issue by responding more positively to such integration attempts.  
 
 Although Iran attended multilateral negotiations with the EU during 
Ahmadinejad's rule, it was not wholly satisfied with the course of the multilateral 
negotiations dominated by a US backed EU, either. In May 2008, Iran presented a 
package to five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), 
called "Package for Constructive Negotiations." In the Package, Iran reiterated its 
commitment to its peaceful nuclear program and argued that the nuclear issue cannot be 
resolved with the carrots and sticks approach. Instead, Iran voiced its intention to start a 
series of extensive negotiations with P5+1 on a variety of issues including economy, 
politics, security and the nuclear crisis.435 Moreover, it also suggested the establishment 
of a committee on nuclear weaponization.436 An American backed EU policy of carrots 
and sticks approach implied a hegemonic and unequal relationship between the US and 
the EU on the one hand, and Iran on the other. By offering a series of multilateral 
negotiations with the P5+1, Iran showed its ambition to be treated as an equal member 
of the international order. The Iranian insistence on equal and multilateral negotiations 
also signifies the Iranian ambition to be treated as an equal and powerful nation.    
 
 The USA, along with the EU and the P5+1, has so far pursued a policy of 
integrating Iran to the international status-quo. Power transition theory predicts that the 
dominant power would only resort to military intervention as a last resort. The stakes 
are high that Iran as the challenger may initiate a military confrontation with USA, or 
with its ally Israel in the region, only when it achieves a power parity with it. Such 
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power parity can be achieved through missile and nuclear capability. However, the 
existence of nuclear weapons may also hinder the eruption of an armed conflict 
between the two due to their deterrence capability. 
 
 The classical deterrence theory argues that the mutually destructive capability of 
nuclear weapons render them unusable. Accordingly, when there is power parity among 
two powers with nuclear weapons, the stakes for an armed conflict decrease. The 
common example given by classical deterrence theorists is the absence of armed 
conflict between two superpowers during Cold War. The power transition scholars 
counter the deterrence theory. Organski argues that the presence of nuclear weapons 
does not hinder an armed conflict between a dominant power and a rising challenger.437 
The only difference is that the existence of nuclear weapons would make war more 
“deadly.”438 In a similar vein, Kugler advances the argument that nuclear proliferation 
will not be able to prevent wars.439 The first reason is that nuclear weaponization will 
not eliminate a state's ambitions to enjoy the benefits of its rise of power based on 
domestic development.440 Second, nuclear weapons will not change a rising power's 
dissatisfaction with the status-quo.441 In short, Kugler's theory concludes that the armed 
conflict cannot be hindered with nuclear weapons. Moreover, such a war would cause 
even more destruction. 
 
 Iran's missile capabilities have been primarily targeted against a possible Israeli 
attack on its nuclear facilities. Given the previous Israeli attack on Iraqi Osirak 
facilities, Iran fears that its own nuclear facilities may experience a similar attack by 
Israel. The question arises as to whether Israel and Iran could start an armed conflict 
when both parties hold nuclear weapons. The classical deterrence theory would argue 
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that a war would be out of question due to the existence of nuclear weapons. On the 
other hand, power transition theory would argue that the possibility for an armed 
conflict would not be eliminated between Israel and Iran. According to the theory, 
building on its rise in power based on domestic development, Iran could engage in an 
armed conflict to attain the regional power position. However, there is yet no empirical 
test validating this power transition theory assumption. Therefore, a discussion on the 
prospect for war between Iran and Israel is an open-ended one. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion     
 
 
This chapter has reviewed the Iranian nuclear program from a power transition theory 
perspective. The chapter has argued that Iran's insistence on its nuclear program despite 
the increasing pressure by the international community for its suspension can be 
explained by its ambition to acquire a regional leading power status. Given its 
increasing GDP levels, high population and oil-rich territory, Iran wants to have a 
greater say in the region. Israel and Iran seem to be the major candidates to fill the 
power vacuum left by Iraq in 2003. The Israeli conventional and nuclear weapons 
capabilities render it advantageous, when compared to Iran. On the other hand, Iran has 
a weakness in conventional military capabilities.  A nuclear option can not only make 
up for the weakness of Iran's conventional capabilities but also strengthen Iran's hand 
against the US presence in the region as well as Israel. Therefore, a nuclear option can 
increase the Iranian stakes to become a regional power.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 COCLUSIO 
 
 
This thesis has sought to explain the Iranian nuclear crisis of 2002 from a power 
transition theory perspective. The crisis erupted with the disclosure of previously 
unknown nuclear facilities in 2002, when anti-governmental Iranians in exile brought 
the Iranian nuclear program into the focus of the international community. Iran was 
both a party to the NPT and had recognized the authority of IAEA to perform 
inspections on its nuclear sites. When compared to Israel, India, Pakistan and North 
Korea, who either did not become a party to the NPT or withdrew from it, the reaction 
of the international community to Iranian nuclear program has been tougher. Among 
these, Israel has not been subjected to any sanctions; and India and Pakistan were 
sanctioned unilaterally by the USA, which were subsequently released. The UN 
Security Council imposed sanctions on both Pakistan and India only after their 1998 
nuclear tests. North Korea was subjected to multilateral UNSC sanctions in 2006, upon 
its first nuclear test, which were then extended in 2009 when it declared itself as a 
nuclear state. Iran, on the other hand, has been subjected to four rounds of UNSC 
sanctions and unilateral US and EU sanctions, whose content is more extensive than 
that of North Korea. Moreover, the sanctions were imposed on Iran in the absence of 
any prior nuclear test and of conclusive evidence that the Iranian nuclear program is 
geared towards nuclear weaponization. Apart from sanctions, European countries 
offered several incentive packages to Iran in exchange for its suspension of the nuclear 
program. Despite these incentives and tough sanctions, Iran has not permanently 
suspended its nuclear activities. Given this account, this thesis has sought to answer two 
interrelated questions. The first question is why the international community is 
specifically concerned about the nuclear program. The second question is why Iran is so 
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insistent on its nuclear program despite such “carrots” and “sticks.”     
 
 An historical overview of the Iranian nuclear program shows that Iran was one 
of the main benefactors of US nuclear technology transfer during the Shah period. 
However, the worsening of bilateral relations following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
and the subsequent Hostage Crisis brought an end to American nuclear technology 
transfer to Iran. Moreover, the USA also sought to prevent other countries such as 
Russia and China from cooperating with Iran on nuclear technology. While the Iranian 
nuclear program came to a halt during Ayatollah Khomeini era, the destructive 
experience of Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 reintroduced the need for military self-reliance.  
As a result, the nuclear program was restarted during Ayatollah Khamenei era.  
 
 The nuclear crisis of 2002 coincides with the presidency of Khatami. It is also 
during his presidency that the international community first engaged in the resolution of 
the crisis. In this respect, France, UK and Germany, also known as the EU-3, initiated a 
series of diplomatic negotiations with Iran. Although the USA was more inclined to 
adopt a hard power policy option against Iran, it still backed these negotiations. The 
empirical analysis of the Iranian nuclear crisis has shown that the course of these 
bilateral negotiations exhibited differences between pre-2005 and post-2005 periods. 
This breaking point coincides with the change of leadership within Iran. The EU-3 
proposed several incentive packages including cooperation in trade, oil sector, regional 
security and nuclear technology. The Khatami government represented the reformist 
faction at home, which was more willing to integrate with the liberal world economy, to 
comply with international norms and institutions, and to eliminate Iran's isolation in the 
international arena. In accordance with this pragmatic foreign policy, the Khatami 
government accepted one of the EU-3 incentive packages and temporarily suspended its 
nuclear program. Although Iran experienced several problems with IAEA reports, 
which resulted in occasional Iranian step-backs from cooperation, Iran under Khatami 
government generally pursued a conciliatory and moderate nuclear policy with the 
international community. 
 
 This moderate and pragmatic foreign policy was replaced by a non-conciliatory 
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and ideological foreign policy when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed power in late 
2005. Representing the hardliner faction of the population, Ahmadinejad promoted the 
revolutionary ideals of military, economic and technological self-reliance. Shortly after 
his election as the president, he resumed all the nuclear activities suspended under 
Khatami's rule. He defied any incentive packages proposed by the EU. Given the failure 
of diplomatic negotiations, the USA referred the issue to UN Security Council, which 
imposed four rounds of sanctions on Iran targeting its oil industry, trade activities, arms 
imports and nuclear-related technological assistance from other countries. Apart from 
these multilateral sanctions, the USA and the EU imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran. 
Despite such tough sanctions, Iran under Ahmadinejad's rule never stepped back from 
its decision to continue with the nuclear program. 
 
 There is ample scholarly work explaining Iran's insistence on its nuclear 
program with reference to external security environment; the flaws in the international 
non-proliferation regime; the role of nuclear weapons as symbols of prestige, 
technological development and modernity; and the impact of domestic politics. All 
these scholarly work has made important contribution to the understanding of various 
facets of the Iranian nuclear issue. Another argument proposed by major scholars of 
Iran regarding the nuclear program is that the main rationale behind the Iranian nuclear 
program is its ambition to become a regional power and to enjoy the nuclear leverage to 
have a greater say in regional affairs. While this argument has been referred to by many, 
it has not been presented in a theoretical framework. 
 
 An evaluation of the change in regional balances between pre- and post-9/11 
periods shows that a power transition perspective can be adopted to further explore the 
Iranian nuclear issue. Iran had always wanted to have a greater say on its neighborhood 
due to its geopolitical positioning between the Middle East, the Gulf region, the 
Caspian and the Caucasus. The fall of the Soviet Union has created an opportunity for 
Iran to exert more influence on its northern borders. The existence of Israel as the sole 
nuclear power in the region; the diminished power of Iran due to the Iran-Iraq War and 
the economic sanctions as well as the arms embargoes imposed by the USA; and the 
rise of Iraq as the major Arab power summarizes the power balances in the Middle East 
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until 9/11. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003 created a  power 
vacuum in the Middle East. Iran stood as one candidate to fill the vacuum left by Iraq in 
the region.  
 
 Power transition theory assumes that the international arena is marked not by 
anarchy, but by hierarchy. There is a dominant power who sits at the top of the system 
and some great powers who may challenge the dominant power once they acquire a 
power parity with it. The dominant power establishes the status-quo, in other words, the 
international rules of the game by projecting its domestic system to the international 
arena. The nature of the transition from the dominant power to the rising one is 
determined by the stance of the rising power to the status-quo. If the rising power gets 
benefits from the status-quo, then it can integrate with the system. There may still be a 
power transition in that case; however, the transition would not necessarily be 
conflictual, but peaceful. If the rising power is dissatisfied with the status-quo, then the 
transition may be conflictual.  In line with these theoretical assumptions, this thesis has 
sought to measure the rise of Iranian power and its dissatisfaction with the US-led 
status-quo. 
 
 Power transition scholars estimate a country's power by looking at its internal 
development level. This thesis has adopted the total GDP levels, size of the military, 
military capabilities, military expenditures, population size and oil supplies as the 
determinants of a nation's power. The statistical data has shown that Iran has superiority 
in GDP levels, size of the military, oil supplies and population size when compared to 
Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, it suffers from the weakness of its conventional 
weapons capabilities. Israel stands as the major rival to Iran thanks to its superiority in 
conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities. At this point, the possible role of nuclear 
weapons for Iran to become a leading power in the region becomes clearer. A possible 
policy option for Iran to fill the military power gap between Israel and Iran could be the 
build-up of nuclear weapons and missiles. Iran has already developed medium range 
missiles and has an advanced program for the development of long-range missiles. 
While Iran has an advanced nuclear program and has exceeded the uranium enrichment 
limit for peaceful purposes, it still refuses the international claims that the program is 
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intended for military purposes. Still, scholars and policy-makers associate the 
advancement in the Iranian missile program to its possible uses to fire nuclear 
warheads.     
 
 The USA is the global dominant power and it projects its domestic system to the 
international arena. Democracy, liberal economy and the role of international 
institutions are the basics of the global status-quo led by the USA today. Moreover, the 
USA has a great military presence in post-2003 Iraq and in the Gulf States. It tries to 
project this global status-quo to the Middle East region with an attempt to preserve its 
material interests in the region, which are ensuring oil supply and price stability, 
providing security to its Gulf allies and fighting global terrorism by bringing 
“democratic stability” to the region. There is a lack of consensus among power 
transition scholars on the measurement of a rising nation's dissatisfaction towards the 
status-quo. This thesis has adopted domestic systems similarity, membership to 
international institutions, satisfaction with the international norms and arms build-up as 
key variables to measure Iranian dissatisfaction with the status-quo.  
  
 The analysis has shown that the revolutionary Iran, with a semi-democratic 
Islamic regime, an inward-looking economy and a self-reliant foreign policy does not 
benefit from the democratic and liberal market-oriented status-quo led by the USA. The 
USA holds the opportunity to impose the status-quo through its alliances with oil-rich 
Gulf States and Israel. The US military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and in the Gulf 
region, coupled by the “axis of evil” and “regime change” rhetoric has increased the 
Iranian dissatisfaction with the dominant power. Moreover, Iran has expressed its 
dissatisfaction with the duality of the international nuclear order, which creates a power 
imbalance between the “nuclear-haves” and “nuclear have-nots” in world affairs. Its 
membership to international organizations not dominated by the USA and its missile 
build-up are the other signifiers of Iranian dissatisfaction.  
 
 The nuclear program and the missile build-up can be taken both as the indicators 
of the Iranian dissatisfaction with the status-quo and as the end-result of that 
dissatisfaction. A comparison of the nuclear foreign policy under Khatami's and 
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Ahmadinejad's rule indicates that there is a correlation between the rise of 
dissatisfaction and the course of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the international 
community. As Khatami's reformist faction was more willing to integrate with the 
international economic and political status-quo, Iran during his rule was more open to 
incentive packages offered by the EU. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad's hardliner 
faction had economic and military interests in the preservation of the revolutionary Iran 
as an isolationist, economically inward-looking state. Therefore, Iran under hardliners' 
rule defied EU incentives and became more insistent on the nuclear program. 
 
 A disruption of the Middle Eastern power balances with the rise of Iran as the 
leading regional power would hamper the American interests in the region. Given the 
possible implications of nuclearization for the rise of Iran, the USA has sought to hinder 
the further development of Iran's nuclear program. With an attempt to abort the nuclear 
program as well as to decrease the Iranian dissatisfaction with the US-led status-quo, 
the USA has sought to integrate Iran to the international status-quo by the use of EU 
incentive packages and UN sanctions. A power transition in the Middle East does not 
directly affect the US' status as the dominant power. However, it affects the global 
power balances, which is expected to take place between the USA and China.    
 
 One question this study could not answer regards the timing of power transition 
in the region. Such a study would require an advanced statistical measurement of the 
nations' internal development levels in terms of GDP levels and military capabilities. 
Most advanced level power transition studies perform a statistical analysis, which 
makes a future projection of nations' internal capabilities to see in what year a power 
transition among relevant players is possible. A similar study could be performed for 
the timing of a possible power transition among Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Another 
question that this study could not answer is the impact of nuclear weapons on the 
prospect of a conflictual power transition. The classical deterrence theory and the power 
transition theory advance two conflicting arguments related to the rule of nuclear 
weapons in power transitions. While the former would expect no conflict due to the 
mutual destructive capability of nuclear weapons, the later would expect a conflict 
which is even more destructive due to the presence of nuclear weapons. Still, the 
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absence of any empirical examples renders the latter argument not easy to be verified 
for the time being. This study can open the way for future power transition research on 
the Iranian nuclear program by addressing these two questions. However, the findings 
on the Iranian rise in power, dissatisfaction and domestic politics can have practical 
implications for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. These findings can open the 
way for policy-makers and nuclear non-proliferation activists to find new conflict 
resolution strategies regarding the crisis.     
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